Page History

...

If "it is trifling with philosophical problems to accept as valid questions questions 
arid answers that have no conceivable bearing on how we propose to live" 
(TO: 373  373 f.), then  then how can any "speculative philosophy," or "categorial categorial 
metaphysics," escape  escape the charge of "trifling" in this sense? (PCH: 687), how can any "categorial metaphysics" as such, i.e., as distinct from the transcendental metaphysics it necessarily implies, possibly pass muster as a valid metaphysics? 
If "it is trifling with philosophical problems to accept as valid questions and answers that have no conceivable bearing on how we propose to live" (TO:373 f.),  then how can any "speculative philosophy," or "categorial metaphysics," escape the charge of "trifling" in this sense? 

So, too, if "the pragmatic principle \[holds\] that a metaphysics must be  livable, must have a  reasonable relation to how one lives" (PCH:  687), how can any "categorial metaphysics"  as such, i.e., as distinct from the transcendental metaphysics it necessarily implies, possibly pass muster as a valid metaphysics? 

5 February 1998