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Wiki MarkupWhat Gamwell does, in effect, is to show that there is a metaphysics of of 
distinctively human existence and an ethics corresponding thereto. This he does does 
by transcendental arguments from any claim to moral validity to its meta-ethical ethical 
implications or presuppositions, which cannot be denied consistently with with 
making or implying any such claim. He then shows how these meta-ethical ethical 
implications or presuppositions in turn imply a minimal ethics, i.e., the universal universal 
formative principle of communicative respect, which is articulated in certain 
universal human liberties/rights/duties, public as well as private, as well as a 
democratic form of government. 
What Gamwell does, in effect, is to show that there is a metaphysics of distinctively human existence and an ethics corresponding thereto. This he does by transcendental arguments from any claim to moral validity to its meta-ethical implications or presuppositions, which cannot be denied consistently with making or implying any such claim. He then shows how these meta-ethical implications or presuppositions in turn imply a minimal ethics, i.e., the universal formative principle of communicative respect, which is articulated in certain universal human liberties/rights/duties, public as well as private, as well as a democratic form of government. 

But, surely, the same conclusion could-and, arguably, should-be reached by arguing, not from moral validity claims in particular, but from any validity claims whatever-as Apel appears to confirm when he says, "All beings who are capable of linguistic communication must be recognized as persons since in all their certain universal human liberties/rights/duties, public as well as private, as well as a democratic form of government. _in all t\!zeir actions and utterances_ _they are potential participants in a  discussion" (quoted in "The Purpose of Human Rights,"_ _Process Studies_ _29, 2  \[Fall-Winter 2000\]: 332; italics added)._

But, surely, the same conclusion could-and, arguably, should-be reached by arguing, not from moral validity claims in particular, but from any validity claims whatever-as Apel appears to confirm when he says, "All beings who are capable of linguistic communication must be recognized as persons since

 

26 December 2002 26 December 2002