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2. It becomes clear from the third passage that, while philosophy appeals to experiences, the experiences that are important for it are observations, and, therefore, experiences, of experience itself -- and, more exactly, of "the dimensions of experience as such, "which is to say, "the strictly general traits of experience," or "those elements in experience that have metaphysical generality, that are valid of all experience and all objects." In other words, carefully reading these passages together makes clear that, in Hartshorne's view, philosophy differs from science not only in being more general but also in having a different datum, or different data -- namely, our own experiencing itself as privileged sample of reality itself.

Wiki Markup*3. That there can be such a difference is grounded in the fact that experience has different aspects. "In actual experience, mind and matter are together, namely, in our experiences. If we know matter at all, we somehow perceive it. But we also perceive mind, for at each moment we are aware both of physical things* *{+}and{+}* *of our own experiences, feelings, thoughts, desires, and so on. Thus both minds (I use the word 'mind' to refer to the reality of experiences) and bodies are together as things given in human experiences. Every experience has an aspect of sense perception, and also an aspect of self-awareness, or awareness of experience itself. The latter includes, or perhaps consists, \ [*{*}{+}sic{+}{*}*\] in memory \ -\- in part, 'immediate memory,' the sense of just having felt or sensed or thought a certain something . . . An experience* *{_}is{_}* *somehow a unity of 'physical,' and 'psychical.' But experience is just what we mean by the 'psychical.' So it seems that the universal concept is that of mind rather than of matter" (*{*}{+}Whitehead's Philosophy{+}{*}*: 114).*

4. This same duality in experience is reflected in Hartshorne's discussions of anthropomorphism. "Anthropomorphism has been shown to be one horn of a not easily evaded dilemma: either we assimilate things to our own human experience and nature, and so perhaps fail to appreciate the extent of their differences from us, or we try to interpret them quite apart from our experience and nature, and then find that this is the same as having no idea of them at all. The only obvious complete alternative to anthropomorphism is the doctrine of an absolutely unknowable, a 'thing in itself.' What things are for us, what we can get out of them, do with them, enjoy in the experience of them, that we can know. Also, what they may be as analogous to ourselves, like us, knowing, willing, loving beings -- though perhaps less or more knowing, willing less or more powerfully, loving less or more comprehensively -- all this we can conceive. But how we can even significantly ask, What can things be, neither as values to us nor as beings conceivable by analogy to us? has proved of the utmost difficulty to explain" (Man's Vision of God: 88).

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