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There would appear to be the need for at least two such distinctions that Hartshorne does not make-at least not explicitly. 

Wiki Markup_Given my proposal to distinguish between metaphysics in a strict sense and in a broad sense, one must distinguish among subjects concretes_ _=_ _instances) between events (or states), individuals, and aggregates in general and the unique events (or states), individuals, and aggregates implied by the concept of understanding or self-understanding individual in particular. What better term could be proposed for a self-understanding individual than "existence" in the emphatic sense in which existentialist philosophers use the term? (Off-hand,_ _I_ _see no reason why, given the concept or term, "self-understanding individual," room cannot be made within "first philosophy" not_ _only_ _for the whole of "fundamental ontology," i.e., "existentialist analysis" \ [Heidegger\], but also for the whole of "universal pragmatics" \ [Habermas\] or "transcendental hermeneutics" \ [Apel\]. Insofar, indeed, as there is an understanding of existence that is given at least implicitly with existence itself, metaphysics, understood as integral intellectual self-understanding, comprises the explication of this understanding of existence as well as the understanding of ultimate reality and of strictly ultimate reality inseparable from it.) _ 

Given my further proposal to distinguish between categorial and transcendental metaphysics, one must distinguish among properties abstracts = objects) between ordinary properties, i.e., individualities, species, genera, and categories, on the one hand, and extraordinary properties, i.e., transcendentals, on the other. By "transcendental properties" (passiones entis), I mean simply the properties expressed by (1) the completely general or neutral idea of "reality" as well as by all the other ideas with which it is convertible (passiones e. convertibiles); and (2) the several logical-ontological type-distinctions spanned by the completely general or neutral idea of "reality" as well as all the other distinctions necessarily implied thereby-such as, e.g., concrete and abstract, relative and absolute, contingent (actual! possible) and necessary (passiones e. disjunctc£). All such transcendental properties can be expressed by terms applying univocally to any and all entities, assuming the relevant logicalontological type-distinctions. Thus, for example, any individual as such can be said to be "concrete," not in a different sense, but in the same sense in which any other individual as such can be said to be "concrete." 

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