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Of all that exists, everything might not have existed except "something" and what it necessarily implies-namely, the one divine something inclusive (actually or potentially) of all the many (actual or potential) nondivine somethings. Although particularization of mere somethingness-divine or nondivine-is and must be contingent, in that every step from the most universal property of somethingness toward its particularization is and must be contingent, it is not contingent but necessary that Of all that that exists, what, if anything, might not have existed? some contingent particularization of somethingness – divine and nondivine – occur.

Wiki MarkupHartshorne says that existence generically is "the self-identity of \ [God's\] all-participating life." "God is ... more or less self-evidently contained in the mere idea of one's own existence, ... not merely as cause of our 'coming to be' but as constitutive of the very meaning of 'coming to be.' .._(MVG:\_ 279 ff).

The first statement is simply the conclusion of the reasoning summarized above; i.e., "existence" is evidently but another way of saying "somethingness," which is there defined as, in effect, the self-identity of the one divine something as inclusive (actually or potentially) of all the many (actual or potential) nondivine somethings. But what about the distinction made in the second statement between God's being cause of our coming to be and being constitutive the very meaning  of our "coming to be"? Is it the same as, or is it different from, the distinction I commonly make between God's being the ground of our being, by making our being really possible in fact as well as in principle, and being the ground of our meaning, by making our being really real and everlastingly significant? The two distinctions, I take it, are essentially the same. To exist, or to be something, is to exist, or to be something, for God. God exists, or is something, for God; and everything other than God exists, or is something, for God -- if, indeed, it exists, or is something, at all.

Wiki MarkupHartshorne says in the same context, "\[W\]e do not 'act' in a pub1ic sense (in the sense in which 'reality' is not a solipsistic concept), that is, we do not really act, except as we act upon God, no matter what else we act upon.It is \ [God's\] response to us that makes our act real, in the sense in which we can call the acts of others also real, and that is the sense of 'reality.''' I take it that this statement fully confirms the essential identity of Hartshorne's distinction with mine. To say that God is constitutive of the very meaning of our "coming to be" is only verbally different from saying either that to exist, or to be something, is to exist, or to be something for God or from saying that what we are and do is really significant only because we act upon God and of God's response to us.  

By the way, it would have been better had Hartshorne written' "We do not 'act' in a public sense, that is, we do not really act (in the sense in which 'reality' is not a solipsistic concept), except as we act upon God," etc.