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Wiki MarkupI have argued that, for universals to be somehow "embodied" (this being required by "the Aristotelian principle," or Whitehead's "ontological principle") is for them "to be included _\[see_ _in some actualityJ-being instantiated as actuality being one mode of \ [such\] embodiment or inclusion, being entertained as possibility being the other" (Notebooks, 16 November 1993)._ _il,_ _._

But what is exactly, for a universal to be "entertained as a possibility," as distinct from its being "instantiated as an actuality"? It is for the universal to belong to the aspect of an actuality relative to its future, wherein the actuality foreshadows or anticipates but does not define or determine successor actualities, as distinct from belonging to the other aspect of an actuality relative to its past, wherein an actuality further defines or determines what was but foreshadowed or anticipated by its own predecessor actualities

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