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Wiki MarkupAccording to Hartshorne, there is a "pretension inherent in theism as such," to the effect that "God is by definition an infinite exception\!" This means, he argues, that "each category has two levels of possible meaning, the ordinary one and the extraordinary one applicable only to God." Thus, if "God" means what theists say it means, God "is' an individual' who yet is not _simply_ an individual, whose 'nature' or quality is not _simply_ a quality, and who 'exists,' but not _simply_ as other things exist." Accordingly, "\[t\]o take God to be simply an individual, simply having a nature or quality, simply existing, is certainly a category mistake, if ever there was one\! Deity must itself be a sort of category, and the supreme category, and until _its_ rules have been investigated, there can be no demonstration that any relevant rules have been violated" (_AD_: 77, 66).  \\ 

But now if deity itself is a category, indeed, "the supreme category," it can hardly be true that "each category has two levels of possible meaning_,"_ etc. (italics added). Obviously, what Hartshorne has to mean is that all categories other than "God" have these two levels of possible meaning. 

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