Versions Compared

Key

  • This line was added.
  • This line was removed.
  • Formatting was changed.
Comment: Migrated to Confluence 4.0

...

Clearly, this sentence can succeed in conveying what he means to say only if his reader tacitly reads "relation" as "understanding relation."

Wiki Markup2.2 And what, exactly, does he mean by "reality as such"?-Does it refer to something utterly refer to something utterly abstract, or rather to something eminently concrete? Or does it refer to something does it refer to something that, in suitably different respects, is both, so that the term as such is term as such is ambiguous, even if systematically so? My guess is that he often uses it to refer to something utterly abstract, as he clearly seems to do, for example, on 582, where he takes the referent of the phrase to include "the nature \[sic\] of God" and glosses it as "nothing other than the necessary conditions of temporal actualizations that are always contingent." it to refer to something utterly abstract, as he clearly seems to do, for example, on 582, where he takes the referent of the phrase to include "the nature [sic] of God" and glosses it as "nothing other than the necessary conditions of temporal actualizations that are always contingent." 

2.3 What, exactly, does Gamwell mean by "the traditional metaphysical project" (567 f.)?-He hardly means, simply "classical metaphysics," although the three representatives of the project that he specifically names are all, arguably, to some degree or other, classical metaphysicians. On the other hand, if he means something like what Hartshorne calls "ultrarationalism," in the sense of applying an wLqualified principle of sufficient reason, Aquinas hardly fits the profile insofar as he certainly affirms (however consistently!) that some things are and must be contingent rather than necessary. But if one attends to what he evidently takes to be the defining characteristics of the project-namely, its assertion of something in all respects absolute or eternal and its denial of anything historically contingent; and if one notes the qualified way in which he speaks of denying contingency "explicitly or implicitly," one may very well take him to mean precisely ultrarationalism, Leibniz and Hegel being understood to deny contingency explicitly, Aquinas, to deny it implicitly in denying that God is in any respect contingent, temporal, relative. 

...