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Perhaps one way to put the matter is this: That only formative rights are to be "constitutionaly stipulated' as Gamwell maintains, does not mean that only formative rights are "fundamental," in Dworkin's sense of the term. all. the other hand, substantive rights may be "fundamental" in Dworkin's sense without being "constitutionally stipulated" along with properly formative rights as Gamwell understands them. Gamwell writes: 

Wiki Markup\[T\]he ultimate terms of political assessment may be restated as a fundamental substantive as a fundamental substantive right: All individuals. have a right to the greatest measure of general empowerment the state can provide or promote equally for all...\[But i\]nsisting that all have a substantive right or set of rights the state should secure is one thing, and stipulating these rights constitutionally is something the greatest measure of general empowerment the state can provide or promote equally for all...[But i]nsisting that all have a substantive right or set of rights the state should secure is one thing, and stipulating these rights constitutionally is something else...A democratic constitution anticipates that the full and free discourse \and free discourse [it constitutes\] will be successful and thus will, through statutory law, provide  provide or promote for all the substantive conditions necessary to real equality in the political process itself. Democratic politics itself is not a substantive possibility unless the government fulfills its moral obligation by pursuing justice as general a substantive possibility unless the government fulfills its moral obligation by pursuing justice as general emancipation...Because a democratic constitution presupposes the ultimate terms of political assessment, the constitution itself implies that the principles of substantive justice are equally permanent \[sc. with those of formative justice\], even if it does not stipulate their content (95 fdemocratic constitution presupposes the ultimate terms of political assessment, the constitution itself implies that the principles of substantive justice are equally permanent [sc. with those of formative justice], even if it does not stipulate their content (95 f.).

Context makes clear, I believe, that what Gamwell understands by "permanent principles" are, in Dworkin's sense, ''fundamental principles." In any case, Gamwell removes any doubt that substantive principles of justice are "equally permanent" with its formative principles. 

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