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In the past, I have criticized Descartes's definition of substance as "that which requires nothing but itself in order to exist"  because it denies the 
essential internal relatedness of concretes to other concretes.  But I  now see reasons to think that the interpretation presupposed by this  criticism may, in 
fact,  be a  misinterpretation. In the past, I  have criticized Descartes's definition of substance as "that which requires nothing but itself in order to exist" because it denies the essential internal relatedness of concretes to other concretes.  But I  now see reasons to think that the interpretation presupposed by this  criticism may, in fact, be a misinterpretation. 

Wiki MarkupIn the course of arguing persuasively that "Whitehead is   ... in full agreement with Aristotle  as to what constitutes the  ultimate metaphysical problem"; and that "\[i\]n declaring that 'the final problem is to conceive a complete  fact' Whitehead is placing himself fully in the great philosophical  tradition," Leclerc holds-again persuasively-that "\[ w \]hat Whitehead means by a  'complete fact'  is  a  'complete  existent,'  that which exists  in the  complete sense of the  word 'exist" Whereupon he  goes on to say:  "This is the same as what Gilson was expressing in the passage above by a distinct ontological unit which is able to subsist in itself and can be defined in itself.' It is  this that Descartes had in mind in defining thethat  with which we are concerned as  that 'which requires nothing but itself in order to exist,' Spinoza and Leibniz  used very similar words in this  connection. It is clear that the factor of 'being,'  of 'existence,' is absolutely central. But it is not 'existence'  as such,  in the  abstract; it is  the  existence  of a  particular,  a  'that.' Moreover, the  'that' which is in question is  the that which is  possessed of 'full  existence,'  the  that which exists  'in  and  of i tself"'  (Whitehead's Metaphysics:  20, 17). in full agreement with Aristotle  as to what constitutes the  ultimate metaphysical problem"; and that "[i]n declaring that 'the final problem is to conceive a complete  fact' Whitehead is placing himself fully in the great philosophical  tradition," Leclerc holds-again persuasively-that "[ w ]hat Whitehead means by a  'complete fact'  is  a  'complete  existent,'  that which exists  in the  complete sense of the  word 'exist" Whereupon he  goes on to say:  "This is the same as what Gilson was expressing in the passage above by a distinct ontological unit which is able to subsist in itself and can be defined in itself.' It is  this that Descartes had in mind in defining thethat  with which we are concerned as  that 'which requires nothing but itself in order to exist,' Spinoza and Leibniz  used very similar words in this  connection. It is clear that the factor of 'being,'  of 'existence,' is absolutely central. But it is not 'existence'  as such,  in the  abstract; it is  the  existence  of a  particular,  a  'that.' Moreover, the  'that' which is in question is  the that which is  possessed of 'full  existence,'  the  that which exists  'in  and  of i tself"'  (Whitehead's Metaphysics:  20, 17). 

If Leclerc is right about all this, as I strongly suspect he is, Descartes's point in asserting the independence of substance is essentially the same as 
Whitehead's  in insisting-in Leclerc's  words-that, "although other types  of entity do exist,  they are (Le., exist as)  either  'ingredients in'  actual entities, or ... 'derivative from'  actual entities. So that whatever there is, in any sense of 'is'  or 'exist,'  either is  an actual entity or has its locus in some actual entity or 
actual entities" (24 f.).  Or it is the same as Hartshorne's point when he insists that the  abstract, although real, is not actual save as somehow included in the concrete, which is  the inclusive form of reality, the abstract being the included form thereof.  And, of course, it is  only of a  piece with this insistence that 
Hartshorne argues (against Aristotle  and the classical tradition!) for  "event pluralism," rather  than "substance  pluralism," Le.,  that the  only fully

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