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One way of formulating this second distinction is to distinguish between "die Historie" and "die GesehiehteGeschichte" after the manner of Martin Kahler as well as Bultmann himself. Another way is to distinguish with H. Richard Niebuhr between "external history" and "internal history." My own way of making what I understand to be essentially the same distinction is to distinguish "the empirical-historical" from "the existential-historical." In the case of history in either sense, the principle is upheld that history is what it is only in relation to someone for whom it is history. In other words, facts of the past become historical facts or events only insofar as they are viewed either empirical-historically or existential-historically, or both. To this extent, justice is done to James's basic point about "the double-barrelled" meaning of "history." But also upheld is the further difference between the two ways in which facts of the past can become properly historical for us.

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"By means of this kind of historical reflection, the phenomena of the past become real historical phenomena and begin to disclose their meanirigmeaning. But this means that objectivity in historical knowledge is not to be attained either in the sense of conclusive knowledge or even in the sense that a phenomenon in its being in itself is perceived by the historian in some purely receptive way. There simply is not any such being in itself of a real historical phenomenon.

"... this does not mean that historical knowledge is subjective in the sense that it depends on the individual preference of the historian who is its 'subject.' If the historical way of asking questions grows out of the historical life of the responsible historian, it includes a readiness to hear the claim that is encountered in the historical phenomenon. For just this reason the demand applying to all scientific research, that it be conducted without presuppositions, also applies to historical research. Of course, historians may not presuppose the results of their work but must silence any of their own personal wishes with respect to its results. But this does not mean that they have to quench their personal individuality for the sake of the objectivity of their knowledge. On the contrary, genuine historical understanding presupposes the utmost liveliness of the 'subjects' who understand, the richest posible possible unfolding of their individuality. Only those are able to understand history who are themselves moved by sharing in history, that is, who are open to the language of history by their own responsibilities for the future. In this sense it is precisely the 'most subjective' interpretation of history that is the 'most objective.' Those alone who are moved by the question of their own historical existence are able to attend to history's claim.

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"... historical knowledge is never closed or definitive any more than is the presunderstanding pre-sunderstanding with which the historian approaches historical phenomena in asking about them. If historical phenomena are not facts that can be neutrally observed but rather disclose themselves in their meaning only to one who approaches them alive with questions, they are always understandable only now in that they speak anew to every present situation. Indeed, the questioning itself arises out of the historical situation, out of the claim of the now, out of the problem that is given in the now. For this reason historical research is never closed but must always be carried further.... Hence, one must say that a historical event can be known for what it is precisely as a historical event -- only in the future. And one may also say that the future of a historical event belongs to it" (150 f.).

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