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1.When Quenstedt argues that lithe the same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God and partly by the creature, but at the same time by God and the creature, as one and the same total efficiency, viz., by God as the universal and first cause, and by the creature as the particular and second cause" (as quoted by Wood, The Question of Providence: 85) -- when he argues so, is he perhaps arguing somewhat as I argue against monergism/Pelagianism, on the one hand, and synergism, on the other? In any case, his use of the distinction between "God as the universal and first cause" and "the creature as the particular and second cause," seems to converge very closely with my use of a similar, ifnot, indeed, the same, distinction in defining God as "the universal and all-inclusive individual," on the one hand, and the creature as "the particular and partially exclusive individual," on the other.

2. As for Quenstedt's talk of "the same effect" (idem effectus) and "one and the same efficiency" (una eademque efficientia), it reminds me of nothing so much as the sort of things Hartshorne says toward the end of Man's Vision ofGod of God about God's being not only the cause of our coming to be, but also constitutive of the very meaning of our "coming to be." In other words, "the same effect," or "one and the same total efficiency," refers to the relevant state(s) of God's consummative/redemptive activity, but for which the creatures included in the state(s) would not have "come to be," would not continue in being, would not really act in the public, nonsolipsistic sense of "reality," etc. How, if at all, this might be expressed in terms of Aristotle's distinctions between the four causes is not clear to me. Perhaps God's being constitutive of the very meaning of our coming to be might be said to be God's being the first, universal formal cause of our being as well as its first universal, final cause.

3. Another insight I've had in connection with this is that God's being the first and universal cause may be just as dual as Hartshorne's distinction employed above suggests it is. That is, God is both the first and universal cause of our coming to be, which is to say, the, all-inclusive, cause but for which we would not be possible either in principle or in fact, and the factor (formal cause?) constitutive of the very meaning of our "coming to be." But, then, assuming the interconnection of formal and final causes, God would also
2 be constitutive of the very meaning of our new coming to be, analogously to the way in which God is constitutive of our having come to be at all. So it would be true both that God partly determines what we are and are to be, while we ourselves and our fellow creatures also partly determine it, and that God and the creatures both enact, not the same act, but "the same effect," " !lone one and the same efficiency," which is to say, the latest state(s) of God's consummative/redemptive activity, which, so far as any particular creature is concerned, is(are) both entirely the act of the creature and entirely the act of God's consummative/redemptive response to the creature.

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