By Schubert Ogden
...
The distinction Calvin implies, I take it, is that between remembering something past, or as past (presuluably presumably Bullinger's view, or what Calvin takes to be his view) and remembering something present, or as present (Calvin's own view). But a problem with this distinction, obviously, is that memory of any kind, by the very concept, can only be of something past that thereby, through being remembered, becomes something present. In other words, the question is not simply whether something remembered is past, or is remembered as past, or whether something remembered is present, or is remembered as present, since it is and has to be both insofar as it is remembered at all. The question, rather, is how what is past becomes present through being remembered: Does it thereby become present in its being in itself, then and there in the past, or does it thereby become present in its meaning for us, here and now in the present?
...