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Corresponding, then, to the usus rei or usus facti is the vis rei or vis facti. In other words, there is a power in the fact of Christ if, and only if, it is used – -- used, namely, by faith. Faith so uses the fact of Christ as to appropriate its power; or, alternatively, the power of the fact of Christ is appropriated by faith's use of the fact.

Question: whatWhat, exactly, is the relation between Luther's concept-term, "the power [vis] of the fact," and Bultmann's concept-term, "the significance [die Bedeutung] of the empirical-historical event"? It seems possible that they could be simply two ways of thinking-speaking about the same thing. On the other hand, recognizing (1) that, for Luther, "the power of the fact" seems to be strictly correlated with "the use of the fact" by faith; and (2) that, for Bultmann, understanding the existential significance of the empirical-historical event is one thing, whereas faith in the sense of positively appropriating that significance for oneself is something else -- recognizing this difference, one may well feel the need for a more nuanced answer.

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This seems to agree closely with Luther's frequent statement that it is the word that is "added" to the factum and makes it understandable as the salvation occurrence by demanding faith (cf. Bultmann, NTM: 40, 119}. It also calls to mind Bultmann's own way of interpreting the word of God as "sober proclamation of the person and destiny of Jesus of Nazareth in their significance as history of salvation." "In the significance that belongs to it, the historical event of the cross has created a new historical situation; the proclamation of the cross as the salvation event asks its hearers whether they are willing to appropriate this meaning, whether they are willing to be crucified with Christ" [41,35 f.]).

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On the other hand, all such assertions of a clearly empirical-historical kind could be either true or false without in any way affecting the truth or falsity of the christological assertion, which being of a different logical kind -- specifically, an existential-historical kind -- has a correspondingly different kind of truth conditions. And this is so even in the case of formulations of the christological assertion that are expressed inapproprately inappropriately in terms that, logically considered, can only be classified as empirical-historical, rather than existential-historical -- which, of course, is exactly the defining characteristic of any properly mythical, or mythological, formulation. Although the meaning of any such formulation is existential, or existential-historical, the terms in which its meaning is expressed are -- again, logically considered, by reference to their "deep strucurestructure," as distinct from their "surface meaning" -- empirical, or empirical-historical, terms.

Because this is so, however, something like Luther's distinction between fides histoncahistorica and fides apprehensiva may very well be said to be the sufficient as well as the necessary condition of distinguishing, as I myself do, between what may be assumed to be true empirical-historically in thinking and speaking about Jesus and what is asserted about him existential-historically in making or implying the constitutive christological assertion. Indeed, it is just my distinction that explains why Luther can say -- rightly! -- that fides historica is of "no help at all" -- namely, because its truth or falsity is completely independent, logically, of the truth asserted on the basis of fides apprehensiva. On the other hand, we may be confident of Luther's agreeing unhesitatingly that what is assumed to be true, by Christians or anyone else, in thinking and speaking about Jesus necessarily presupposes that the subject term "Jesus" does indeed succeed in picking out a real historical figure, about whom it is possible to make assertions of logically different kinds that are meaningful whether or not they are also true. And Luther, too, would undoubtedly want to say that this same presupposition is therefore also necessarily made by Christians in claiming, as they do, that the christological assertion is not only appropriate but also true -- although its truth, like its meaning, is logically different from that of any of the many things they may simply assume about Jesus in asserting the one thing about him that they, as Christians, are given and called to assert.

A final word: The difference discussed here -- between the logically different kinds of things that may be assumed or asserted about Jesus, truly or falsely, on the basis of the same necessary presupposition -- is not the only important difference between fides historica and fides apprehensiva. No less important -- certainly, from Luther's standpoint -- is the difference between faith as a merely intellectual matter of holding certain things to be true and faith as an eminently existential matter of laying hold of a word of promise, understanding oneself and leading one's life accordingly, in obedient trust and fidelity. But, clearly, taking account of this difference in no way affects the validity of the account I have given of the other difference, any more than proceeding in the reverse direction would do so. Analysis requires that both differences be accounted for if Luther's distinction between fides historica and fides apprehensiva is to be correctly understood.

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But it seems clear that Luther does not explicitly say, and presumably would not explicitly say, that assertions made on the basis of the fides apprehensiva could be true even though the assumptions made by the fides historica were false. At the same time, one could argue that he definitely implies just this when he says, "das hilft nichts [sic !]" if one "glaubt, diese Historie sei wahr, wie sie lautet, ... weil aIle SunderSünder, auch die Verdammten das glauben" (75). Surely, if it is of no help at all to believe that the history is true, since even the damned do that, it's hard to see how believing the truth of the history could even be a necessary condition of Christian faith.

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