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But even if one takes seriously these sound reasons for denying that the conviction of faith can be proved, one need not join Gerrish in simply accepting the claim in question. Aside from the fact that there is a kind of religious or existential "proof" of, or argument for, faith, there are also moral as well as metaphysical reasons that can be given for the necessary implications of faith, and so, indirectly, for the truth of faith itself. Of course; , no particular religion as such can ever be deduced simply from a true metaphysics and a true ethics, taken either singly or together. Although the truth of a religion's understanding of existence, insofar as it is true, must indeed be implied by a true metaphysics and a true ethics, it itself as a particular way of conceiving and symbolizing its understanding is irreducibly historical. As such, it is simply given -- a datum for metaphysics and ethics, rather than a deduction from them. And this means that validating its claim to truth also always involves certain properly historical and hermeneutical procedures. Even so, a religion's understanding of existence is in no way beyond the sphere of metaphysical and moral argument, and good reasons of both kinds can be given for its truth, insofar as it is really true.

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