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In any event, it is clear from the above passages that, while philosophy, including existentialist analysis, is, in Bultmann's understanding, a phenomenological, or ontological, science, it nevertheless functions, or can be made to function, at least indirectly, existentially -- not in that it calls us to a specific self-understanding, but in that it calls us to understand ourselves authentically. Precisely in clarifying what existing means, existentialist analysis at least indirectly calls us to exist, and that means, to exist authentically, in freedom from the past and for the future. The difficulty, however, is that philosophy as such is as powerless to give us such an authentic existence as it is to give us any existence whatsoever. In this respect, philosophy, in BultrnannBultmann's view, can never do more than, on Luther's analysis, the law can do: it can confront us with the demand to live authentically, but only so as to condemn us. It cannot give us the freedom from ourselves without which we are unable to obey the law's demand.

But if this is correct, one can understand Bultmann's statement that, while Heidegger, unlike KamIah," does not characterize the attitude of resolution as submission[,) ] it is clear . .   . that accepting one's thrownness by resolving to die is an act of radical highhandedness." "If genuine life is a life of submission, it is missed not only by those who live by disposing of what can be disposed of instead of by submitting but also by those who understand even submission to be an aim that they can dispose of and do not see that their authentic life can only be an absolute gift." In this respect, the existentialists, who seek to get beyond the everyday existence of securing ourselves by disposing of what can be disposed of, may be thought of analogously to Paul's thinking about the Jews who seek "righteousness," only to lose the very thing they seek, because they want to be "justified" by their own works, because they want to "boast" in the presence of God. "In the 'boasting' of Jews who are faithful to the law, just as in the boasting of Gnostics who are proud of their wisdom, it becomes clear that the basic human attitude is the highhandedness that tries to bring within our own power even the submission we know to be our authentic being, and so finally ends in self-contradiction" (28).

This is the very point Bultmann returns to in clarifying the difference between "the false scandal" that myth occasions for the modern woman and man and "the true scandal" of the kerygma itself, by which they, no less than women and men otherwise, are offended. "Modern women and men, also, attempt to understand their existence by objectifying thinking (to the extent that they are not 'existentialists' who are beyond this). For them the genuine scandal lies in the fact that they are expected not to understand themselves by objectifying thinking, which is in fact always a striving after security. The whole thrust of New Testament thinking, insofar as it is opposed to that of modern women and men, lies precisely in its breaking down their security and showing them that they can exist in a genuine way only by surrendering their own securing and existing out of the grace of God. The genuine scandal is at bottom one given to the will, and it is a scandal for thinking only insofar as the will explicates itself in thinking! (Naturally, the scandal is the same for the existentialists insofar as they secure themselves, not, to be sure, through objectifying thinking, but through their own free resolve.)" (Karl Barth/-Rudolf Bultmann Briefwechsel: 176).

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