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The picture one gets from the way Whitehead writes is something like this:

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One place, perhaps, is where he argues from "the doctrine of human experience as a fact within nature" (237). "[A]ny doctrine," he says, "which refuses to place human experience outside nature, must find in descriptions of human experience factors which also enter into the descriptions of less specialized natural occurrences." Why? Because "[i]f there be no such factors, then the doctrine of human experience as a fact within nature is a mere bluff. . . . We should either admit dualism . . . or we should point out the identical elements connecting human experience with physical science." But this argument, simply as such, is obviously question-begging if it is taken as an argument for the identity of "individual things" generally with "individual occasions of experience." For whether or not we can abstract even from experience and still have actuality or concreteness is precisely the question; and so it won't do simply to assume – again! – that assume—again!—that experience as such, at least, must be among the "factors," analyzable in descriptions of experience, that also enter into the descriptions of less specialized natural occurrences.

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