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1. We need a general or neutral idea of ultimate reality spanning the differences between all logical types, hence applicable, e.g., to individuals as well as to events or states and to abstract properties as well as to groups of individuals. So understood, "ultimate reality" contrasts only with "unreality,"   "mere appearance," or "fiction."

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3. God constitutes a unique logical type, because, while God is an individual, insofar comparable with all other individuals, God is only also the individual, the only metaphysical, or necessarily existing, individual, insofar incomparable with all others.

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1. In some places, Hartshorne speaks of "levels of existence," distinguishing three such: (1) "the occurrence [sic!] of certain actual states of individuals"; (2) "the existence of certain individuals"; (3) "the existence of certain kinds of individuals or of certain class-properties" (LP: 63 f.; cf. RSP: 204 f.). Of these he says, "the kinds [sc. of individuals = class properties] cannot exist save in individuals, nor the individuals save in states; still, in which individuals or states they exist remains a further, a contingent determination." "Individuals exist in states, each of which can only be contingent; but that there are states embodying the individual mayor may not be contingent, depending upon whether or not the definition of 'state of X' involves any arbitrary selection" (LP: 64, 66). "Contingency is found wherever one goes from the abstract toward the concrete. 'Something exists I ' does not entail 'Animals exist,' this does not entail 'Foxes exist,' and this does not
entail, 'Fox here with torn left ear exists"' Any step toward concrete particularity is logically a non-necessary one. But, likewise, any step from the particular to the specific of which it is a particularization, or from the specific to the generic of which it is a specialization, is logically necessary. Thus, when we reach the most abstract and universal conceptions, we arrive at entities which are entailed by any statements whatever, and this is precisely what necessary means" (LP: 97). (I observe that Hartshorne's illustrations here, "Something exists," "Animals exist," etc., correspond exactly with what he elsewhere distinguishes as "metaphysical category," "generic character," "specific character," "individual being or existent" [CSPM: 101]. Clearly, "levels of existence" is not anything like as happy a formulation as "levels of reality [of is below].") Of the abstract Hartshorne says: lithe more abstract something is, the less it derives its character from other things and the more universally they derive theirs partly from it" (LP: 83). This is, presumably, a "rule" explicative of the logical structure of "abstract," or "relatively abstract." Along the same lines, Hartshorne says that lIonly the completely abstract is non-contingent or absolute, everything less abstract is contingent and relative" (LP: 140). "Whereas both individuals and abstractions (other than those of uttermost generality) can have aspects of relativity, can depend in some way and degree upon contingent relations . . only individuals, not abstractions, can feel or think or remember" (CSPM: 154).

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