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Logical-Ontological Type Differences in Outline: Ten Theses ^* 

To be real in the most general sense of "reality, " which contrasts with "unreality, " "mere appearance, " or ''fiction, " is to be real for the one extraordinary, everlasting individual and also for at least some other events and/or ordinary, transitory individuals that either have become or are in process of becoming real in the same general sense. 

In this most general sense, everything is real for something, and only nothing is real for nothing. 

There is a difference, however, in logical-ontological type between (1) things that are real solely and simply in the most general sense that they are objects, in that they are real for the one extraordinary, everlasting individual and also for at least some other events and/or ordinary, transitory individuals; and (2) things that are real in thefuller sense that other things either were or are also real for them as themselves processes of becoming, extraordinary or ordinary, and therefore are not only objects but also subjects. 

Just as "objects" so understood is equivalent in meaning to "properties" or "abstracts," so "subjects" is equivalent in meaning to "instances" or "concretes"-more exactly, "concrete singulars" (see Thesis 6 below). Also, the concrete singulars that are real in the sense that things are also real for them are one and all processes of becoming, or, in A. N. Whitehead's term, of "concrescence," i.e., growing together. Therefore, to be real in the fuller sense in which subjects are real is not simply to be but also to become.

The following equivalences in meaning should be kept in mind in reading the theses and their elaborations: aggregates -composites; extraordinary -universal == ontological; ordinary == particular == ontic; objects == properties == abstracts; subjects == instances == concretes. 

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