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Hartshorne himself admits this in so many words when he (1) identifies potentialities with the more or less abstract; and (2) argues that "[o]n any showing there is a division of potentialities into two radically different levels [sic!]: the level which contains the categories, those utterly general dimensions of reality . . . without which as at least implicitly involved nothing at all can be conceived; and the level of specific qualities, from which it seems possible really to abstract entirely and still have meaning. . . ." (WP: 94-97).

He may also be said to admit it implicitly when he typically grants that, simply as abstract concepts, "concreteness" and "abstractness" are related symmetrically, each requiring the other if either is to be a meaningful concept; and that it is only when one adverts to "concrete things or realities," as distinct from "concreteness" and "abstractness" as abstract concepts, that the important asymmetry between them becomes apparent -- namelyapparent—namely, because "concreteness . . . is the inclusive idea" (cf., e.g., "Duality versus Dualism and Monism": 52-55).

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