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1. Significantly, Hartshorne makes no allowance for a "noncognitivist" analysis of theism as theists understand it. On the contrary, he simply assumes -- I assumes—I should think with every justification -- thatjustification—that, so far as theists themselves are concerned, theism has the kind of meaning that makes the question of truth a logically proper question. On this assumption, the three possibilities he allows would certainly appear to be the only possibilities.

2. It is noteworthy that in his answer to the first question, the operative verbs Hartshorne uses to characterize what philosophy -- or philosophy—or theism as a philosophy -- does—does, as distinct from what science does, are "integrate" and "elucidate." In his answer to the second question, on the other hand, the operative verb used for the same purpose is "explain." Is there some reason for this difference? I suspect there is. In his first answer, Hartshorne is talking, not about philosophy in general, but about theism in particular, even though the clear implication of the penultimate sentence in his answer is that theism is precisely a philosophy. Thus he speaks, not, as he does in his second answer, about "(philosophical) theories" (or "views") in general, but about "(philosophical) ideas of God" in particular. If the function of the first is to explain in the way in which philosophical theories (or views) are supposed to do, the function of the second is to integrate or elucidate such explanatory theories (or views) -- or—or, as Hartshorne also calls them, the "principles" or "ideas" that all science and all life presuppose. The relevant test of an idea of God, in other words, is whether, or to what extent, it integrates or elucidates all of the other ideas that we could not fail to employ insofar as we know or live at all.

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