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It is false to say, as Hartshorne does, that "only persons -- orpersons—or, at least, sentient individuals -- have individuals—have intrinsic value" ("The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument": 235 f.).

Not only persons or sentient individuals, but.alsq also anything else that is comparably concrete has intrinsic (as well as constitutive) value. Why? Because the line between intrinsic (as well as constitutive) and (merely) constitutive value lies between all concretes, on the one side, and all abstracts, on the other.

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