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On the other hand, it is not simply wrong to say that the necessary aspect of deity is the ultimate determinable, or, as Hartshorne can say elsewhere, "the supreme essence, the Form elevated above all other forms as such" (AD: 294). Although any abstract simply as such is a determinable (even if only completely universal abstracts="categories" in Hartshorne's sense, or, as I prefer to call them, "transcendentals," are "pure," or "ultimate," determinables), there are determinables that are not abstracts but concretes. Specifically, individuals are determinables, and individuals are, in their own way, concretes, rather than abstracts. Of course, individualities=individual essences are abstracts, even as are species, genera, and (in my view) categories, on the one hand, and transcendentals, on the other. But individualities are one thing, individuals, something else. And while individualities, like any abstract, can be somehow particularized and concretized, and, in this sense, determined, individuals can not only affect but also be affected by others as well as themselves, and, in this further sense, be determined. Thus Hartshorne can say, "The necessary being is the ultimate determinable without which determinates would determine nothing," since "only because Greatness takes account of particular forms do they have any importance in final perspective" (AD: 204). In short, God is rightly said to be "the ultimate determinable" in God's necessary aspect because the idea of God alone, among completely abstract and universal ideas, is self-individuating -- andindividuating—and, for reasons Hartshorne gives elsewhere, also self-explanatory (AD: 293 f.).

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