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Because from my experiencing x with feeling there is no valid inference to the conclusion that x itself either is or has feelings other than my own. In some cases, to be sure, this may be a valid inference, because I can experience my own (past) feelings with feeling. But that it is a valid inference in all cases begs the question -- the question—the question, namely, whether feelings can feel anything other than (other) feelings. That they can feel nothing without (themselves having) the subjective form of feeling need not mean that they can feel nothing (which is itself) without the objective form of feeling (cf. CSPM: 241). It needs to mean only that they can feel nothing that is without whatever objective form(s) is (are) necessary to their feeling it with the subjective form of feeling with which they in fact feel everything they feel. What objective form(s) is (are) thus necessary, however, is precisely the question -- the question—the question that Hartshorne begs rather than answers.