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Verificationism, as a theory of truth, is wrong. It reduces truth to something else---being ideally verifiable. But if it were right, the property of being ideally verifiable would be necessary and sufficient for a belief to be true; and being ideally verifiable couldn't itself be something that we need truth to explain. It's clear, however, that verificationism can meet neither requirement.

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Finally, there is a severe disconnect between the verificationism people espouse and what they actually do. If we really believed that verificationism were the truth about truth, it would be utterly mysterious why we are so passionate in disagreeing about the topics about which we are most passionate in disagreeingtdisagreeing. Far from inferring that all talk about poetry, philosophy, art, literature, and religion is cognitively meaningless, we should confidently conclude that there must be something deeply wrong with a verificationist theory of truth that requires such an inference.

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