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On the Distinction between "Being-in-Itself" and "Meaning-for-Us"  

1.  Analysis  discloses  that  Analysis discloses that "real"  and  its  cognates  are  systematically  ambig­uous,  in  that,  while  it has  a  and its cognates are systematically ambig­uous, in that, while it has a "field-invariant  forceforce,"  it it has   "field-depend­ent  standardsstandards."  This  is  not  surprising,  of  course,  because  the  same  syste­matic  ambiguity  attends  "true"  and  its  cognates,  with  which  "real"  and  its cognates  are  correlative.  For  this  reason;  then,  one  could  say  that  the  dis­tinction  between  This is not surprising, of course, because the same syste­matic ambiguity attends "true" and its cognates, with which "real" and its cognates are correlative. For this reason; then, one could say that the dis­tinction between "being-in-itself"  and  and "meaning-for-us"  is  misleading,  insofar as  it implies,  or  appears  to  imply,  that  "reality"  is  not  thus  systematically ambiguous,  and  hence  field-dependent  as  well  as  field-invariant. 2.  But  this  is  in  no  way  to  say  that  there  is  not  a  difference  within  any given  field  between  what  is  real  and  what  is  not.  For  if what  is  real,  given some  mode  of  reasoning,  some  way  of  taking  account  of  things  that  we  are  in one  way  or  another  obliged  to  take  account  of,  is,  indeed,  relative  to  this mode  of  reasoning,  this  way  of  taking  account  of  things,  it is  not  in  the  least relative  to  any  particular  conclusion  arrived  at within  this  mode  of  reasoning or  way  of  taking  account  of  things.  In  other  words,  there  remains  the  distinc­tion  between  what  is  believed  to  be  true,  given  this  mode  of  reasoning,  and what  is  worthy  of  being  believed  true, given  the  standards is misleading, insofar as it implies, or appears to imply, that "reality" is not thus systematically ambiguous, and hence field-dependent as well as field-invariant.

2. But this is in no way to say that there is not a difference within any given field between what is real and what is not. For if what is real, given some mode of reasoning, some way of taking account of things that we are in one way or another obliged to take account of, is, indeed, relative to this mode of reasoning, this way of taking account of things, it is not in the least relative to any particular conclusion arrived at within this mode of reasoning or way of taking account of things. In other words, there remains the distinc­tion between what is believed to be true, given this mode of reasoning, and what is worthy of being believed true, given the standards established by this same mode of reasoning. In this sense, one could say that the distinction between  established  by  this same  mode  of  reasoning.  In  this  sense,  one  could  say  that  the  distinction between   "being-in-itself"  and  and "meaning-for-us"  is  both  pertinent  and  important, insofar  as  it expresses,  or  is  taken  to  express,  that  what  is  worthy  of  being believed  is  one  thing,  what  in  fact  is  believed,  something  irreducibly  different. 
3.  It would  appear  clear  enough,  then,  that)however  religious  utterances  rep­resent  a  mode  of  reasoning,  or  a  way  of  taking  account  of  what  we  are  somehow obliged  to  take  account  of,  within  that  mode  or  way  there  is  a  distinction  be­tween  what  is  worthy  of  being  believed  and  what  in  fact  is  believed,  and  hence sufficient  reason  to  employ  the  distinction  between  is both pertinent and important, insofar as it expresses, or is taken to express, that what is worthy of being believed is one thing, what in fact is believed, something irreducibly different.

3. It would appear clear enough, then, that)however religious utterances rep­resent a mode of reasoning, or a way of taking account of what we are somehow obliged to take account of, within that mode or way there is a distinction be­tween what is worthy of being believed and what in fact is believed, and hence sufficient reason to employ the distinction between "being-in-itself"  and and "meaning-for-us."  It would  appear  to  be  no  less  clear  that  no  religious  ut­terance  could  be  said  to  be  true  that  did  not  speak  about  the  reality  it pur­ports  to  be  about  not  only  in  its It would appear to be no less clear that no religious ut­terance could be said to be true that did not speak about the reality it pur­ports to be about not only in its meaning for-us but also in its being-in-­itself--not only as what we in fact believe, but also as what is worthy of our belief, whether we in fact believe it or not.

4. But this still leaves open the question of the mode of reasoning, or way of taking account of things that must somehow be taken account of within which religious utterances are either true or false. The answer to this question can be given only by rightly locating the religious mode of reasoning, or way of taking account of reality, relative to the metaphysical mode of reasoning, on the one hand, and the moral mode of reasoning, on the other. (I can't see my way clear to doing this rightly here. The essential point is that, while the religious mode of reasoning overlaps, and hence necessarily presupposes both the metaphysical and the moral modes, religious utterances nevertheless are neither properly metaphysical nor properly moral. This means, among other things, that religious utterances as such meaning  for-us  but  also  in  its  being-in­itself--not  only  as  what  we  in  fact  believe,  but  also  as  what  is  worthy  of our  belief,  whether  we  in  fact  believe  it or  not. 4.  But  this  still  leaves  open  the  question  of  the  mode  of  reasoning,  or  way of  taking  account  of  things  that  must  somehow  be  taken  account  of  within  which religious  utterances  are  either  true  or  false.  The  answer  to  this  question can  be  given  only  by  rightly  locating  the  religious  mode  of  reasoning,  or  way of  taking  account  of  reality,  relative  to  the  metaphysical  mode  of  reasoning, on  the  one  hand,  and  the  moral  mode  of  reasoning,  on  the  other.  (I  can't see my  way  clear  to  doing  this  rightly  here.  The  essential  point  is  that,  while the  religious  mode  of  reasoning  overlaps,  and  hence  necessarily  presupposes both  the  metaphysical  and  the  moral  modes,  religious  utterances  nevertheless are  neither  properly  metaphysical  nor  properly  moral.  This  means,  among  other things,  that  religious  utterances  as  such as distinct from the metaphysical and moral assertions they necessarily implyclaim  to  be  expressions  of  the authentic  self-understanding  whose  possibility  is  implied  both  by  a  true  meta­physics and  a  just morality. Thus,  while  they  make  or  imply  claims  about self,  others,  and  the  whole,  they  do  so  only  as  authorizing the  self-understanding  that  they  also  express.  So  far  as  the  reli­gious  mode  of  reasoning  as  such  is  concerned,  then,  "God"  in  its proper  theis­tic,  as  distinct  from  its  broader,  religious,  meaning  refers  to  the  universal individual  as  authorizing  a  self-understanding  of  radical  trust  and  radical loyalty.  To  affirm,  accordingly,  "I  believe  in  God,"  is  to  affirm  not  only that  one  in  fact  does  believe  in  God  but  also  that  one  in  principle  ought  to believe  in  God  even  if one  does  not  in  fact  do  so,  because  God  gives  and  de­mands  just such  faith.  By  comparison,  then,  with  the  way  in  which  metaphys­ics  takes  account  of  God,  one  could  say,  quite  understandably,  religious  ut­terances  have  to  do  with  the  meaningimply – claim to be expressions of the authentic self-understanding whose possibility is implied both by a true meta­physics and a just morality. Thus, while they make or imply claims about self, others, and the whole, they do so only as authorizing the self-understanding that they also express. So far as the reli­gious mode of reasoning as such is concerned, then, "God" in its proper theistic, as distinct from its broader, religious, meaning refers to the universal individual as authorizing a self-understanding of radical trust and radical loyalty. To affirm, accordingly, "I believe in God," is to affirm not only that one in fact does believe in God but also that one in principle ought to believe in God even if one does not in fact do so, because God gives and de­mands just such faith. By comparison, then, with the way in which metaphys­ics takes account of God, one could say, quite understandably, religious ut­terances have to do with the meaning-of-God-for-us,  not  with  the  beingnot with the being-of-God­in-itself.  But  this  would  neither  imply  the  illegitimacy  in  principle  of metaphysical  talk  about  God  (on  the  ground  that  it mistakenly  tries  to  over­come  the  systematic  ambiguity  of  IIreal,.'  etc.) nor collapse  the  crucial  distinc­tion  between  what  is  believed  and  what  is  worthy  of  belief.  It would  simply make  clear  the  important  difference  between  religion  and  metaphysics.  And  so, too,  one  could  show,  with  the  no  less  important  difference  between  the  reli­gious  mode  of  reasoning  and  the  moral. 

5. An  analogy  may  be  useful.  The  criteria  appropriate  for  common  sense  talk about  what  is  real  allows  one  to  say  of  the  sun  at sunset  that  it is  "really red."  To  deny  that  such  talk  is  about  the  real,  on  the  ground  that  yet  other criteria require  one  to  say  that  the  sun  at  sun­set  is  "really  yellow"  is  simply  to  shift  the  discussion  to  another  mode  of reasoning.  What  the  religious  mode  of  reasoning  means  by  ultimate  reality  is what  confronts  us  with  the  possibility  of  authentic  self-understanding.  To deny  that  the  talk  involved  in  the  religious  mode  of  reasoning  is  about  the real,  on  the  ground  that  yet  other  criteria-those of the metaphysician, say, ­require  one  to  say  that  ultimate  reality  is  the  universal  individual  that  is the  ground  and  end  of  all  other  individuals  and  events,  etc.,  is,  again,  sim­ply  to  shift  the  discussion  to another  mode  of  reasoning.

God-­in-itself. But this would neither imply the illegitimacy in principle of metaphysical talk about God (on the ground that it mistakenly tries to over­come the systematic ambiguity of "real," etc.) nor collapse the crucial distinc­tion between what is believed and what is worthy of belief. It would simply make clear the important difference between religion and metaphysics. And so, too, one could show, with the no less important difference between the reli­gious mode of reasoning and the moral.

5. An analogy may be useful. The criteria appropriate for common sense talk about what is real allows one to say of the sun at sunset that it is "really red." To deny that such talk is about the real, on the ground that yet other criteria require one to say that the sun at sun­set is "really yellow" is simply to shift the discussion to another mode of reasoning. What the religious mode of reasoning means by ultimate reality is what confronts us with the possibility of authentic self-understanding. To deny that the talk involved in the religious mode of reasoning is about the real, on the ground that yet other criteria-those of the metaphysician, say, ­require one to say that ultimate reality is the universal individual that is the ground and end of all other individuals and events, etc., is, again, sim­ply to shift the discussion to another mode of reasoning.

6. The christological payoff of all this can be put very briefly. If the sub­ject of the constitutive christological assertion is a constant, the predicate is avariable that has had and can have any number of values. Whatever its values, however, the function of the variable is to affirm of the subject that it is the decisive revelation of God in the sense of explicitly author­izing the authentic self-understanding that God implicitly authorizes in and and through all human experience. But this means, then, that christological ut­terances are a special class of utterances representing the religious mode of reasoning. As such, they intend to talk about the real in its being-in­ itself as well as in its meaning-for-us, insofar as they express not only what in fact is believed concerning the subject of the christological asser­tion, but also what in principle ought to be believed, whether it in fact is believed or not. At the same time, they, too, are personal address, indirect if not direct, in that they are at one and the same time statements about Christ and about myself, about my own authentic possibility. By comparison with metaphysical statements, then, they can be said to be about the meaning­ of-Christ-for-us, not about the being6. The  christological  payoff  of  all  this  can  be  put  very  briefly.  If  the sub­ject  of  the  constitutive  christological  assertion  is  a  constant,  the predicate is avariable  that  has  had  and  can  have  any  number  of  values.  Whatever  its values,  however,  the  function  of  the  variable  is  to  affirm  of the  subject that  it is  the  decisive  revelation  of  God  in  the  sense  of  explicitly  author­izing  the  authentic  self-understanding  that  God  implicitly authorizes  in  and and through  all  human  experience.  But  this  means,  then,  that  christological  ut­terances  are  a  special  class  of  utterances representing  the  religious  mode of  reasoning.  As  such,  they  intend  to  talk  about  the  real  in  its  being-in­ itself  as  well  as  in  its meaning-for-us, insofar  as  they  express  not  only what  in  fact  is  believed  concerning  the  subject  of  the  christological  asser­tion,  but  also  what  in  principle  ought to  be  believed,  whether  it in  fact  is believed  or  not.  At  the  same  time,  they,  too,  are  personal  address,  indirect if  not  direct,  in  that  they  are  at one  and  the  same  time  statements  about Christ  and  about  myself,  about  my  own  authentic  possibility. By  comparison with metaphysical statements,  then,  they  can  be  said  to  be  about  the  meaning­ of-Christ-for-us,  not  about  the  being-of-Christ-in-himself. 

2 July 1980

1.  On  the  one  hand,  to  hold,  as  I  do,  that  it is  important  to  talk  about the  being  of  God  in  itself  as  well  as  the  meaning  of  God  for  us  may  appear  to deny  that  all  talk  about  the  being  of  God,  as  of  the  being  of  anything  else, takes  place  in  terms  of  some  field(s)  of  discourse,  established  by  some  possi­ble  human  question(s)  and  concernOn the one hand, to hold, as I do, that it is important to talk about the being of God in itself as well as the meaning of God for us may appear to deny that all talk about the being of God, as of the being of anything else, takes place in terms of some field(s) of discourse, established by some possi­ble human question(s) and concern(s).--This,  however,  I  have  no  intention  of denying,  because  I  entirely  agree  that  meaningful  talk  about  the  being  of  any­thing  is  relative  to  some  presupposed  mode  of  reasoning;  and  I  insist  that  one can  agree  with  this  without  being  a  metaphysical  neutralist.

 2.  On  the  other  hand,  to  hold,  as  Bultmann  does,  that  it  is  illegitimate  to talk  about  the  being  of  God  in  itself  as  well  as  the  meaning  of  God  for  us  may appear  to  deny  that  all  talk  about  God,  like  any  other  talk  purporting  to  ex­press  truth,  presupposes  the  distinction  between  what  is  worthy  of  being  be­lieved  and  what  in  fact  is  believed.--This,  however,  Bultmann  hardly  has  any intention  of  denying,  because  he  entirely  agrees  that  there  is,  indeed,  a  nec­essary  distinction  between  what  is  true  and  what  is  believed  with  respect  to God,  etc. 

3.  Clearly,  then,  there  need  be  no  contradiction  between  our  two  positions. 

23  July  1980 

1.  Bultmann's  thesis  is  correct  that  talk  of  God  is  strictly  existential,  in  that  it is  always  talk  about  the  meaning  of  God  for  us. 

2.  But  strictly  existential  talk  has  two  aspects--metaphysical  and  moral. The  first  has  to  do  with  the  necessary  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  our existence  and  of  all  existence;  while  the  second  has  to  do  with  the  authentic possibility  of  our  existence  for  acting  responsibly  in  relation  to  all  other existence.  The  essential  point  about  existential  talk  is  that  these  two  as­pects  are  mutually  determining--our  authentic  possibility  being  the  mode  of existence  appropriate to ultimate  reality,  and  conversely  (Geertz). 

3.  Because  this  is  so,  one  can  indeed  say  that  theology  must  be  able  to  speak of  God  in  his  being  in  himself  as  well  as  of  God  in  his  meaning  for  us.  But, in  saying  this,  one  should  be  clear  that  one  is  not  talking  either  about  two different  things  or  about  two  (abstract)  aspects  of  one  thing  but  about  one of  the  two  (abstract)  aspects  of  one  thing  (namely,  its metaphysical  aspect) and  this  one  thing  itself  (namely,  existential  talk  about  God).

however, I have no intention of denying, because I entirely agree that meaningful talk about the being of any­thing is relative to some presupposed mode of reasoning; and I insist that one can agree with this without being a metaphysical neutralist.

2. On the other hand, to hold, as Bultmann does, that it is illegitimate to talk about the being of God in itself as well as the meaning of God for us may appear to deny that all talk about God, like any other talk purporting to ex­press truth, presupposes the distinction between what is worthy of being be­lieved and what in fact is believed.--This, however, Bultmann hardly has any intention of denying, because he entirely agrees that there is, indeed, a nec­essary distinction between what is true and what is believed with respect to God, etc.

3. Clearly, then, there need be no contradiction between our two positions.

23 July 1980

1. Bultmann's thesis is correct that talk of God is strictly existential, in that it is always talk about the meaning of God for us.

2. But strictly existential talk has two aspects--metaphysical and moral. The first has to do with the necessary conditions of the possibility of our existence and of all existence; while the second has to do with the authentic possibility of our existence for acting responsibly in relation to all other existence. The essential point about existential talk is that these two as­pects are mutually determining--our authentic possibility being the mode of existence appropriate to ultimate reality, and conversely (Geertz).

3. Because this is so, one can indeed say that theology must be able to speak of God in his being in himself as well as of God in his meaning for us. But, in saying this, one should be clear that one is not talking either about two different things or about two (abstract) aspects of one thing but about one of the two (abstract) aspects of one thing (namely, its metaphysical aspect) and this one thing itself (namely, existential talk about God).

3 May 19793  May  1979