By Schubert Ogden
Page History
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[T |
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]o |
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be |
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a |
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self |
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is |
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not |
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merely |
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to |
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be |
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continually |
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becoming, |
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but |
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also |
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to |
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exist, |
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in |
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the |
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emphatic |
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sense |
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in |
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which |
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'existence' |
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means |
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that |
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one |
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is |
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consciously |
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aware |
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of |
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one's |
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becoming |
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and, |
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within |
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the |
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limits |
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of |
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one's |
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situation, |
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responsible |
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for |
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it. |
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Thus |
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one |
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is |
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aware, |
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above |
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all, |
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of |
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one's |
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real |
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internal |
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relatedness—not only |
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to |
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one's |
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own |
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ever-changing |
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past |
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and |
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future, |
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but |
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also |
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to |
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a |
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many-levelled |
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community |
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of |
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others |
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similarly |
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caught |
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up |
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in |
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time |
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and |
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change |
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and, |
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together |
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with |
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them, |
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to |
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the |
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all-inclusive |
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whole |
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of |
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reality |
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itself. |
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But |
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one |
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is |
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also |
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aware, |
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relative |
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to |
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this |
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same |
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whole |
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of |
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reality, |
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of |
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one's |
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own |
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essential |
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fragmentariness |
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and |
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of |
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the |
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equally |
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essential |
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fragmentariness |
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of |
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all |
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others. |
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With |
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respect |
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to |
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both |
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time |
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and |
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space, |
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the |
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whole |
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alone |
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is |
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essentially |
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integral |
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and |
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nonfragmentary, |
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having |
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neither |
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beginning |
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nor |
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end |
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and |
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lacking |
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an |
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external |
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environment. |
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This |
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is |
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not |
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to |
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say, |
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however, |
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that |
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the |
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whole |
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of |
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reality |
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is |
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experienced |
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as |
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mere |
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unchanging |
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being, |
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in |
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every |
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respect |
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infinite |
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and |
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absolute. |
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On |
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the |
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contrary, |
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insofar |
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as |
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the |
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whole |
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is |
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neither |
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merely |
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abstract |
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nor |
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a |
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sheer |
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aggregate, |
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it |
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must |
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be |
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like |
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the |
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self |
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and |
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anything |
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else |
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comparably |
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concrete |
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and |
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singular |
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in |
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being |
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an |
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instance |
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of |
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becoming, |
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or |
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an |
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ordered |
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sequence |
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of |
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such |
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instances, |
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which |
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as |
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such |
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is |
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always |
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finite |
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in |
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contrast |
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to |
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the |
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infinite |
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realm |
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of |
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possibility |
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and |
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relative |
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and |
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not |
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absolute |
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in |
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its |
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real |
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internal |
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relations |
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to |
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others |
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("Process |
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Theology |
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and |
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the |
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Wesleyan |
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Witness": |
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29). |
Closely convergent with this, I believe, is a statement of Hartshorne's in which he says of theism's assertion of the existence of God: \
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[A |
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]lthough |
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the |
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question |
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is |
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not |
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empirical |
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in |
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the |
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scientific |
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sense, |
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it |
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is |
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experiential |
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in |
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that |
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direct |
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experience |
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can |
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suggest |
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its |
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truth |
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to |
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those |
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on |
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a |
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higher |
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level |
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of |
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consciousness. |
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Mystics |
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have |
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often |
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claimed |
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to |
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experience |
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God, |
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and |
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I |
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do |
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not |
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see |
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that |
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atheists |
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can, |
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in |
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an |
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equally |
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intelligible |
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sense, |
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claim |
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to |
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experience |
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God's |
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nonexistence. |
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There |
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is |
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a |
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phenomenal |
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meaning |
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for |
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the |
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presence |
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of |
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God |
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but |
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not |
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for |
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the |
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sheer |
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absence |
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of |
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God. . . . |
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|
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feeling |
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ourselves, |
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as |
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we |
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do, |
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to |
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be |
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fragments |
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of |
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reality, |
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we |
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are |
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somehow |
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feeling |
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that |
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whole |
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of |
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which |
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we |
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are |
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fragments. |
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We |
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have, |
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however, |
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only |
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our |
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experience |
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as |
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model |
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for |
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the |
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idea |
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of |
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the |
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all-inclusive |
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whole |
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in |
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question. |
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Hence |
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the |
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whole |
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can |
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only |
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be |
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for |
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us |
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an |
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inclusive |
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experience, |
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a |
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super-experience |
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if |
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you |
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will. |
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It |
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cannot |
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be |
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a |
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mere |
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machine |
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(which |
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is |
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an |
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empty |
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schema |
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anyway), |
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but |
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only |
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the |
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primordial, |
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everlasting, |
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or |
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eminent |
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form |
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of |
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awareness |
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("In |
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Defense |
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of |
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Wordsworth's |
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View |
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of |
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Nature": |
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87). |
Or, again, I think of how Hartshorne argues elsewhere for the claim that "the idea of God is a reference to direct experience" from "our very definition of perfection as 'superiority to all other beings that exist or could exist'."
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What is the meaning of 'all' and of 'superior to'? How are we able to refer to the entire sweep of existence, the universe as such? And how are we able to speak of superiority, not in some utterly relative sense, superior for this purpose perhaps not for that, but simply, unqualifiedly superior? Or superior for all or the best purposes? The only intelligible answer to those questions is in terms of a direct experience of God. We know, as primitively as we know anything, that we are part, not the whole, of what is, and in this knowledge is involved the awareness of the whole as such, not in its details distinctly seen, but in its generic character. The sense of being coordinate to others, the sense of coexistence (something of which is directly given in the intuition of space or extension), is as primitive as life itself, and the analysis of this sense reveals God as its intelligible content; for only within a common impartial unity can such coordination obtain; and this impartial inclusiveness is precisely the omniscience and all-appreciativeness of God. For it must be a unity, inclusive of values as such, if it is to explain coexistence. Values distributed among persons can be compared and considered as coexistent only if there is a value measuring and including them, but this can only be the value the persons all have for an inclusive person. For only persons—or, at least, sentient individuals—have intrinsic value ("The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument": 235). |
Finally, I think of the following clearly convergent argument of Hartshorne's:
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An animal, which cannot say God, equally cannot say I. There is no derivation of the first notion from the second; but the two are from the outset in contrast in experience. The animal feels both itself and God . . . and thinks neither; we feel and can think both. We are, indeed, likely to call the divine 'I,' 'Truth' or 'reality'; that is, we think of certain abstract aspects of the inclusive something, and do not quite realize consciously that it must be an inclusive experience, the model of all experience in its personal unity. If the foregoing is incorrect (and my saying it is no proof of its correctness), then so far as I can see the idea of God is meaningless. The question, is there a God, for me at least coincides with the question, can God be directly and literally known (in individual essence, though not in actuality or in concrete fullness)? (The Divine Relativity: 39 f.). |
But if phenomenological considerations such as these are essentially sound, there should be no doubt about the basis in experience for my transcendental metaphysics (and ethics). Nor is there any reason why I can't make Whitehead's formulation of the essential insight of metaphysics entirely my own:
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The many become one, and are increased by one. . . . Also there are two senses of the one—namely, the sense of the one which is all, and the sense of the one among the many. We are each of us, one among others; and all of us are embraced in the unity of the whole (Process and Reality: 21c; Modes of Thought: 110r). |
14 April exist~" What is the meaning of 'all' and of 'superior to'? How are we able to refer to the entire sweep of existence, the universe as such? And how are we able to speak of superiority, not in some utterly relative sense, superior for this purpose perhaps not for that, but simply, unqualifiedly superior? Or superior 2 for all or the best purposes? The only intelligible answer to those questions is in terms of a direct experience of God. We know, as primitively as we know anything, that we are part, not the whole, of what is, and in this knowledge is involved the awareness of the whole as such, not in its details distinctly seen, but in its generic character. The sense of being coordinate to others, the sense of coexistence (something of which is directly given in the intuition of space or extension), is as primitive as life itself, and the analysis of this sense reveals God as its intelligible content; for only within a common impartial unity can such coordination obtain; and this impartial inclusiveness is precisely the omniscience and all-appreciativeness of God. For it must be a unity, inclusive of values as such, if it is to explain coexistence. Values distributed among persons can be compared and considered as coexistent only if there is a value measuring and inclutling them, but this can only be the value the persons all have for an inclusive person. For only persons--or, at least, sentient individuals-have intrinsic value ("The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument": 235). Finally, I think of the following clearly convergent argument of Hartshorne's: An animal, which cannot say God, equally cannot say I. There is no derivation of the first notion from the second; but the two are from the outset in in contrast in experience. The animal feels both itself and God ... and thinks neither; we feel and can think both. We are, indeed, likely to call the divine 'I,' 'Truth' or 'reality'; that is, we think of certain abstract aspects of the inclusive something, and do not quite realize consciously that it must be an inclusive experience, the model of all experience in its personal unity. If the foregoing is incorrect (and my saying it is no proof of its correctness), then so far as I can see the idea of God is meaningless. The question, is there a God, for me at least coincides with the question, can God be directly and literally known (in individual essence, though not in actuality or in concrete fullness)? (The Divine Relativity: 39 f.). But if phenomenological considerations such as these are essentially sound, there should be no doubt about the basis in experience for my transcendental metaphYSics (and ethics). Nor is there any reason why I can't make Whitehead's formulation of the essential insight of metaphysics entirely my own: The many become one, and are increased by one.... Also there are two senses of the one-namely, the sense of the one which is all, and the sense of the one among the many. We are each of us, one among others; and all of us are embraced in the unity of the whole (Process and Reality: 21c; Modes of Thought: 110r). 14 April 2005
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