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Whitehead says, II"Everything has some value for itself, for others, and for the whole," and he even defines lithe "the dim meaning of fact--or actuality-lasfact—or actuality—[as] intrinsic importance for itself, for the others, and for the whole" (MT: 151, 159). But just what can be meant by an actual occasion's having some value or intrinsic importance for itself is anything but clear. for

In any case, what Whitehead's own most fundamental principles require as the defining characteristic of actuality, as distinct from reality more generally, is not that it have value for itself—whatever that might mean—but itself-whatever that might mean-but that it have value in itself, and so, as I should say, that it have intrinsic value. This any actuality has because, while, like anything real at all, it is, or is destined to be, of value for others, it is the kind of reality for which other things can have value. It is valuable in itself, because it is somethingfor something for which anything can in principle have value-mattervalue—matter, make a difference, and so on.In any case, what Whitehead's own most fundamental principles require as the defining characteristic of actuality, as distinct from reality more generally, is not that it have value

8 August 2001