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WhtWhat's wrong with the term, "mind in genera!,general" or "mind in the generic sense"?

What's wrong is that either its meaning or referent is unclear; or else its meaning is inconsistent -– and that, either because such meaning as it has contradicts its alleged complete generality, or purely generic sense (i.e., it commits the "pathetic fallacy"), or because such meaning as it has is redundant, being indistinguishable from the meaning of "concreteness in genera!,general" or "concreteness in a generic sense," defined purely formally, or transcendentally.

18 June 2005 

Hartshorne defines lithe "the social" as "the appeal of life for life, of experience for p'ppripncpexperience. It is 'sharpd shared experience,' the echo of one eXlwrience experience in another. l-ience Hence nothing can be social that is without experience." And lithe "the minimum of experipncp experience ... is fpplingfeeling. Creatures are social if they feel, and fpel feel in relation to each others' feelings" (Reality as Social Process: 34; dcf. 136, where he says that to have a "social life" is to have a "life of sympathetically responsive and at the same time creative feeling"; and 'To be social is to weave one's own life out of strands taken from the lives of others and to furnish one's own life as a strand to be woven into their lives. It is giving and receiving, neither having priority over the other."). 

Hartshorne speaks variously of '''mind,' 'soul,' or 'experience,' in general and as such." And he defines "subject" to mean "anything that can be said to be aware of (know or feel or intuit) anything ... in a radicaJJy radically broad and nonanthropomorphic senseI! (n9non-anthropomorphic sense" (69; on 75, he speaks specifically of "experience as such").

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