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By "eITlpiriccd.1y falsifiable/' is m.eant empirically falsifiable" is meant factually falsifiable with a specific difference. Any utterance D1.ay may be said to be factually falsifiable if t.here there are some at least conceivable facts that would render it false. But whether any such utterance also etnpirically empirically falsifiable is another and independent question. For even though . all factual utterances must s0111ehow somehow apply, or fail to apply, through experience, experience itself cOlnprises Inore comprises more than its merely en1pirical empirical aspect strictly and properly understood. Along with the external sense perception of ourselves and the world, which is properly distinguished as "empi rica]empirical," we also enjoy an . inner, nonsensuous perception of our own existence as interrelated with others and with the inclusive whole of reality as such. AI though Although this other properly "existential" aspect of our experie.nce perforce discJosesmore than lnere experience perforce discloses more than mere fact, being the perception as well of the metaph.ysicallynecessary, SOl1W metaphysically necessary, some of what it discloses, including our own existence, is indeed 111.erely merely factual, with the consequence that at least SOlne some of the utterances that apply through it ate are themselves factually falsifiable. Even so, they are existentially rather than elnpirically empirically falsifiable, since the experience through which they apply, or fail to apply, is not the experience we have through our senses, but our nonsensuous experience of our own existence. 

An10ng sllch Among such factually falsifiable utterances are those about the prilnal primal fact of hum.an human existence as well as about the world and God as related to it or to other f(lcts specifical1y facts specifically as such. To be sure, even SOlne some anthropological uttef,lllces utterances may be, in a bro(ld broad sense, lnetaphysicalmetaphysical. Although h.ulnan human existence is entirely fnctu(ll factual or contingent and so in principle different frOln from the strictly nccessclry necessary existence of God and, in a suitably different sense, of the world as wcJC well it nevertheless has a unique pri111acyprimacy, which insofar entitles it to be induded included among the objects of lnetaphysical metaphysical understanding. It has such primacy becC1usebecause, although it is certainly not constitutive of reality as such, God alone being the individual who is that, it is constitutive of our IIlli.icrsfl7l1ding understanding of reality. But for the fact of our existence as hUlnanhuman, not only would we have no understanding whatever, not even elnpiricaJ empirical or scientific, but we also vvould would have no understanding of the inner nature of reality as such. We ourselves are the one existent whose nature we understand by being it, by understandin.g understanding it, so to speak, fr0111 from within as well as front
'ithoutfrom without. Consequently, such knowledge as we can have of tbe the inner nature of _of anything else we can have only by way of analogy with whatever we are ableto able to know of our own existence. Because

Because this is so, there is one sense of the word "anthropology" in which it is properly taken, along with "coslnologycosmology" and "theology/' " to designate the nonelnpirical nonempirical inquiries of special Inetaphysicsmetaphysics. Nevertheless, since our own existence, unlike that of God and the woddworld, is merely factuat factual, such utterances as we can 111.ake make about it, or about the world and God as related to it or to other facts, are Inerely merely factual clailns claims that could conceivably be fillsefalse.

 Because religious utterances are typically of this kind, being about lnnnan human existence a.nd and its authentic realization, Inanymany, if not aU all of theInthem, are factually falsifiable. Of course, the qualification is essentiat essential, since foundational religious u.tterances utterances about God's existence and essential nature and activity arc are strictly . metaphysical and so in no way subject to factual falsification. But true and iinportant important as this is, it is also true tll.at that specifically religious utterances are in nlany many cases the kind of utterances whose trut.h truth or falsity is entirely a matter of fact. Given t.he the essential content of these utterances, indeed, it couJd could not be otherwise. Thus, frorn from the standpoint of Christian f,l itllfaith, for ins tanceinstance, this logical truth but reflects the truth of its own witness that our creation and consumnl.ation consummation alike are not necessary but free, being entirely the gift of God's grace to be obediently received by the faith that works through love.

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Given  Given the axioins axioms of classical Christian theislll.theism, especially the archaxionl arch-axiom of the divine "simplicity"sinlplicity, it follows necessarily that no assertion about God can be factuClLly factually nonfalsifiable unless all assertions about God are so. In other words, the classical theist can consistently construe the theistic issue as a properly metaphysical issue only by accepting the implication that it is _J1olliil1S bill nothing but a metaphysical issue-with issue—with the further ilnplication implication that God is insofiH insofar forth irrelevant to our life in the world because it Cil.l1 can be of no possible relevance to God. 

But how different the case of the neoclassical theist, who frankly rejects the aXiOlTl axiom of "sinlplicitysimplicity," l11.aintaining maintaining instead that God is not a rnonopolar monopolar but ,I a dipolar God, \;\fho-although who—although existing necessarily as God-essentially God—essentially exists only as the God of some world of contingent individuals other than CodselfGodself, to all of which God is related internally as well as externally. Given these ,1Jterna ti ve axiol11.s, the fundalnental alternative axioms, the fundamental assertions that God exists and exists as God, as the one universal individual who is the all-inclusive ground (md and end of all other individuals and events, are all strictly 111.etaphysical c1ssertions metaphysical assertions and as such iln111.Une immune to factual falsification. But if these assertions are true, they necessarily i111.ply imply that any nUlnber number of other, Inerely merely factual assertions 111llSt ellso must also be true, even though they do not ilnplyimply, of course, just which sLlch Clssertions such assertions actually are true. Furthern1.oreFurthermore, necessarily included clmong sllch ,1sserUons among such assertions are certain factual assertions about God, all of which hzwe have the forrn form of asserting that God sOlnehow is somehow appropriately related internally to just this, that, or the other particular world of contingent individuals and events 'thilt that in fact happpens happens to exist. Being factual, these assertions Clbout about God are so far frOln from being immune to factual falsification as to be factually falsifiable in a perfectly straightforward sense. Had some other world existed than actuaHy actually exists, God would be appropriately related to it instead, and any assertion that God is son1.ehow somehow related to the actual world would of necessity be false. This need not ilnplyimply, naturally, that such factual c1ssertions 1:1S111(1), be l11.ade assertions as may be made about God are also empirically falsifiable, in the sense, say, til,lt that their lneaning meaning is equivalent to their "elnpirical empirical expectations." 

Although for a neoclassical theisln theism the truth that God exists and exists as Cod God is strictly rnetaphysical metaphysical and therefore factually nonfalsifiable, God's ess(c'ntial natura! as Codessential nature as God, as . modally coextensive with all actuality and all possibility, implies that God is also the ever-growing whole of all factual truth, and therefore precisely "suprernely supremely relevant." One l11.ay may also observe thcltthat, although the sheer existence of God as metaphysically necessary can tndecd milke indeed make no factual difference, this is not at all so of 111.y my belief in God's existence or ofm)! of my willingness to entrust myself here and now to God's real, f(lctual factual relation to Ine me and and my world and to live in loyalty to thelnloving them—loving God and all other things in God. To both belief in God and obedient faith in GocC God in the sense of trust in God and loyalty to God, there are very real factual alternatives; and so far as the witness of Christian faith is concernedis concerned, they LTla.ke make just the factual differences that areby far tIle rnost are by far the most important for every single 011.(' one of us.