Page History

...

Maximizing the good requires social cooperation and coordination and therefore social practices or institutions in which roles are to be played or duties are to be carried out whatever the consequences.

A putative moral prescription is meta-ethically senseless and so cannot be valid

More than that the meta-ethical character of every prescription prescribes by implication at least one social practice-namely, the specific practice designed to resolve disagreement about the validity of prescriptions, so as to enable common decisions. This practice, which suspends pursuit of other purposes in order to assess the validity of contested moral claims, may be called-using Habermas's term, "discourse"-"moral discourse." Thus moral discourse is the specific social practice of argumentation, or common critical reflection, in which claims to the validity of moral prescriptions are validated or invalidated by giving reasons.

The specific practice of moral discourse, in turn, both implies and is implied by a principle that governs social action universally. If they are morally permissible, promises are to be kept because they're made, instih~onal institutional commitments are to be fulfilled because they have been accepted, and laws are to be obeyed because they have been enacted.

A putative moral prescription is meta-ethically senseless and so cannot be valid if the individuals to whom it is supposed to apply cannot (1) cannot act as it prescribes; and (2) so act because the prescription is valid. So far as the first point is concerned, in other words, "ought implies can": a putative moral prescription is meta-ethically senseless unless the alternatives for action open to an agent to whom it is supposed to apply include the prescribed action. As for the second point, a putative moral prescription is meta-ethically senseless if an agent to whom it is supposed to apply cannot choose in a manner that expresses her or his dissent, in the sense of her or his determination that the prescription is not valid but invalid.

More than that the meta-ethical character of every prescription prescribes by implication at least one social practice—namely, the specific practice designed to resolve disagreement about the validity of prescriptions, so as to enable common decisions. This practice, which suspends pursuit of other purposes in order to assess the validity of contested moral claims, may be called—using Habermas's term, "discourse"—"moral discourse." Thus moral discourse is the specific social practice of argumentation, or common critical reflection, in which claims to the validity of moral prescriptions are validated or invalidated by giving reasons.

The specific practice of moral discourse, in turn, both implies and is implied by a principle that governs social action universally In all human relationships, individuals are morally bound to treat one another as potential participants in moral discourse. This means that all human individuals always have the rights that define them as such potential participants, one of these being the right to become an actual participant. These universal human rights belong to each and every participant in a universal social practice. Nor can they be overridden by any consideration of consequences, or by any other 2 prescription, because they are necessarily implied by the meta-ethical character of any claim to the validity of a moral prescription, whatever its content.

The principle governing this universal social practice is itself metaethicalmeta-ethical, in the sense that the social action it prescribes is explicitly neutral to all moral disagreements. Treating all individuals as potential participants in moral discourse is explicitly neutral even to disagreement about whether all individuals should be so treated, since that disagreement raises a question about what treatment reason really requires.

As such, this meta-ethical principle is a formative principle of social action, in the sense that adherence to it is explicitly neutral to all moral disagreement. In this, it is distinguished from all substantive prescriptions, adherence to any of which is not thus neutral. But, then, the social practice governed by this formative principle is itself a formative practice, and the rights it prescribes are formative rights.

This meta-ethical principle of social action may be formulated in Kantian terms as requiring that every individual recognize all human individuals as persons, which is to say, as potential participants in moral discourse. The formative rights that belong to persons may therefore be called "communicative rights," even as the formative principle itself may be called "the principle of communicative respect."

The actual content of communicative rights can be derived from the necessary the necessary conditions of moral discourse as a specific social practice. Such conditions Such conditions include equal freedom for all participants to advance and contest any contest any moral claim and to argue for or against it as the siituation situation may require; the  the absence of internal coercion in the form of strategic activity on the part of fellow of fellow participants, or-alternatively expressed-uncompromised commitment or—alternatively expressed—uncompromised commitment to seek only the truth on the part of all participants; and the absence the absence of external coercion that might influence accepting or contesting claims contesting claims to validity. Thus communicative rights include the rights to life, to bodilyformative principle of social action, in the sense that adherence to it is explicitly neutral to all moral disagreement. In this, it is distinguished from all substantive prescriptions, adherence to any of which is not thus neutral. But, then, the social practice governed by this formative principle is itself a formative practice, and the rights it prescribes are formative rights. inb~grity and movGmont, to tho ueo of perBonal property, and to conscienceto bodily integrity and movement, to the use of personal property, and to conscience, in the sense of the right to choose and act in accordance with 3 onewith one's own understanding of the good. Because these rights have a strictly individualistic strictly individualistic character-being —being definable without reference to any humanassociation-the human association—the liberties corresponding to them may be called

liberties."

cannot be overriden "private liberties." Of course, even these liberties are not unlimited, even if they cannot be overridden by any moral prescription. Each individual has a right to equal to equal freedom (equal freedom being a necessary condition of participating inthe in the specific social practice of moral discourse); and so the freedom of each is morally is morally constrained by, and is subject to interference in order to prevent her or her or his invasion of, the rightful freedom of every other. 

But private liberties do no and cannot exhaust the freedoms protected by protected by communicative rights, because they include the right to be an

One may say, accordingly, that the proper provisions of a democratic constitution institutionalize the formative principle of communciative respect. This means that the political association should be constituted as such as a full and free political discourse. A constitution is really democratic

Thus the constitution must also stipulate the right of all"private Of course, even these liberties are not unlimited, even if they actual participant actual participant in moral discourse. To attend to this right returns us to the question the question of the actual patterns or institutions of common decision making. In the endthe end, the right to participate in moral discourse is the right to participate inin political discourse, which is to say, in a particular association or social practice that practice that nonetheless has a general character in that its distinguishing purpose is to is to order or govern all association in society. Thus the formative principle of commun.icative of communicative respect prescribes a democratic political association. And this includes this includes the right to have democratically determined decisions coercively enforcedcoercively enforced. But, then, the constitutive principles of this association must be legal be legal in character, in that the institutional process whereby governing activities governing activities are properly determined must itself be coercively enforceable. 

One may say, accordingly, that the proper provisions of a democratic constitution institutionalize the formative principle of communicative respect. This means that the political association should be constituted as such as a full and free political discourse. A constitution is really democratic if, and only and only if, it allows the political association to maximize the extent to which makingwhich making, interpreting, and enforcing political decisions is effected through full and full and free political discourse. individua~or  

Thus the constitution must also stipulate the right of all individuals or citizens to citizens to be participants in the association's decisions. The duties correlative with correlative with these rights must be explicitly neutral to all substantive social (moral or politicalor political) prescriptions precisely because the discourse is about the pertinence 4 of pertinence of such prescriptions to legal norms. This means that a democraticconstitution democratic constitution provides the one set of legal prescriptions that must be explicitly accepted explicitly accepted by each and every citizen as a participant in the political discourse, including  including discourse about whether the actual constitution is really democraticreally democratic, and even whether democracy itself is the proper form of the political the political association. In this way, a democratic constitution also stipulates a set ofset of public liberties, which includes the familiar freedoms of speech, of the pressthe press, of assembly and of petition, as well as due process and equal protection of protection of the laws. Also included is the freedom of religion, in the sense of the right of right of each citizen to choose her or his explicit belief about the most fundamental character fundamental character of reality and human purpose. The principle of religious freedom in turn in turn implies that constitutional stipulations should do nothing more than institutionalize than institutionalize the formative principle of communicative respect. They cannot They cannot properly require of any citizen as a participant in political discourse explicit discourse explicit adherence to any substantive prescription for social action. On the other the other hand, precisely because the constitution is not substantive, but formative but formative only, the rights-liberties it stipulates may not be overridden by any other any other moral prescription pertinent to the activities of the state, including religious including religious ones. 

* * * * * * *

The universal principle of communicative respect is, in fact, an indirect an indirect application of a comprehensive teleological principle. But it might appear might appear that this formative principle as such implies only Ifthat there are, or, at leastat least, can be, valid substantive prescriptions, but does not and cannot imply anything imply anything about what these prescriptions are. In truth, however, the presupposition the presupposition that at least some substantive prescriptions can be valid is senseless is senseless unless the formative principle of commlmicative communicative respect also implies also implies what is meant by "valid substantive prescription," i.e., the criterion by which by which substantive prescriptions can be distinguished as valid or invalid. But any But any such criterion is itself a substantive moral principle, and a universal substantive universal substantive principle at that, since the formative principle that implies it is universal. 5 is universal. 

If we let "principles of justice" designate specifically political principles, we  we may say that justice has a compound or self - differentiating character. This means This means that there is a distinction between the formative principle of communicative of communicative respect that should be articulated and institutionalized in a democratic a democratic constitution and the substantive principle that should determine decisions determine decisions taken in or through full and free political dicoursediscourse. This substantive principle substantive principle necessarily implies as an abstract aspect of itself the overriding formative overriding formative principle of a democratic constitution; conversely, this formative or formative or constitutive principle itself implies the substantive principle of justice as its as its own concrete ground. And this is so even if it is no business of any constitution any constitution to stipulate what is substantively required. ,...

But whether Butt whether justice in this compound sense in turn depends on aa "comprehensive telos is another controverted question. Assuming that the case the case for a neoclassical metaphysics has been, or can be, made; and that the comprehensive the comprehensive purpose this metaphysics formulates grounds justice as compound as compound in this sense, we may proceed to identify an inclusive humanright human right that is substantive in character and that implies, even as it is, in turn, implied  implied by, the formative principle of communicative respect. 

From the standpoint of neoclassical metaphysics, the basic metaphysical basic metaphysical notion is "creativity," according to which actualization as such consists such consists in the unification of diverse relations to other real things, actual and possibleand possible. In the wl.ique unique case of the divine individual, who is the primal source primal source and the final end of reality, the relations in question are to Because human activities enjoy opportunities for good that are vastly extended beyond those of nonhuman worldly existence, future human creativity occupies a preeminent place in our pursuit of the comprehensiveall things actual all things actual and possible, whereas in all other cases, the relativity involved is not completenot complete, but partial or fragmentary, being to only some things. In either case, however however, "the good" in its metaphysical meaning consists in realizing unityinunity ­in-diversity as a contribution to the all-inclusive divine creativity, and the greater the greater good is always the realization of greater creativity. The comprehensive telos comprehensive telos or purpose, then, is the actualization of maximal unity-in-diversity in the in the world and therefore also in the divine reality. 

Because human activities enjoy opportunities for good that are vastly extended beyond those of nonhuman worldly existence, future human creativity occupies a preeminent place in our pursuit of the comprehensive telos 6 telos. In.deed, there is a sense in which we act best toward the natural worldwhen world when we aim at the maximal human future. Recognizing this, we may formulate may formulate the comprehensive purpose as a principle for moral decis~ons as followsdecisions as follows: maximize creativity in the human future as such. 

Because the higher possibilities of human achievement are a gift from past from past human achievements, favorably ordered, the comprehensive telos prescribes telos prescribes the pursuit of our maximal common humanity-in humanity—in the long run. In.  In other words, what should be maximized is the creativity shared between or among or among human individuals, "common humanity" meaning in this context neither context neither the descriptive characteristics nor the normative rights that are universally are universally human, but rather the common world so far as it is constituted by the by the communication of distinctively human achievements. To be related to a greater a greater common humanity offers individuals the possibility of making a greater constribution a greater contribution to it, and actualizing this possibility, in turn, amplifies opportunity amplifies opportunity still further. In this sense, the common world, or (as it may also be also be called) the human order, has a certain self-surpassing character, although this although this character is a normative rather than a merely descriptive feature insofar as insofar as it identifies what should be the case. 

Our maximal common humanity may be reformulated in terms of conditions of conditions of emancipation, understanding by "emancipation" the opportunity the opportunity to be creative, of which, of course, each individual must decide what decide what use is to be made. Individuals are more or less emancipated, depending on depending on the natural and human context in which their lives are set. Because the order the order created by human achievements is greater insofar as each individual benefits individual benefits from and contributes to it, the comprehensive telos prescribes pursuit of pursuit of everyone's emancipation, everyone's freedom and opportunity to be creative be creative and thereby to make possible the creativity of others. For any given individualgiven individual, the conditions of emancipation are complex, consisting in part in those in those that are distinctively hers or his and extending through others specific to specific to intimate and local associations to still others shared with increasingly wider increasingly wider communities. In . their widest form, we may speak of "general conditions general conditions of emancipation," meaning by that those that are important or potenti8.11y import8.nt important or potentially important to the creativity should be the case. of any individual \VhntDoCVCl" Du(:'h aswhatsoever such as, e.g., health, economic provision, education, cultural richness, 7environmental  environmental integrity, and the general patterns of associational life as such. These  These are the subject matter of justice; and the pursuit of justice seeks to maximize to maximize the general conditions for more distinctive local associations and individualsand individuals, thereby maximizing everyone's emancipation. 

Because maximizing the good requires social coordination and cooperationand cooperation, however, a comprehensive teleology prescribes its indirect application indirect application through social practices or institutions whose norms are morally bindingmorally binding, whatever the consequences of actions "separately taken." Emancipating  Emancipating all prescribes a wide range of social practices with norms that steady that steady and enhance the quality of human interaction. 

Nor is this teleological validation of social practices merely empirical. all. On the contrary, the comprehensive telos, and thus the pursuit of our maximal our maximal common humanity, grounds the meta-ethical principle of communicative of communicative respect and the universal social practice of moral discourse governed discourse governed by it; and this is because being a recipient of communicative respect is respect is a formative condition of emancipation. The comprehensive telos, and thus pursuit thus pursuit of our maximal common humanity, also grounds a democratic political democratic political association because such an association is prescribed by the same formative same formative principle of communicative respect. The right to participate in the widest the widest possible moral and political discourse, whereby social practices are legislated are legislated and justice pursued, is also a formative condition of emancipation. Moreoever Moreover, the substantive principle of justice that ought to be convincing in democratic in democratic discourse and, through such discourse, ought to control all political all political decisions is implied by the same comprehensive telos. This is the principle the principle that may be formulated so: maximize the general conditions of emancipation of emancipation to which there is equal access for all. 

Corresponding to the substantive principle of justice as general emancipation general emancipation is a universal human right that may be called "the right to general to general emancipation." In contrast to the formative rights, private and public, properly  properly stipulated in a democratic constitution, this right is a substantive right substantive right that may be stated as follows: human individuals as such have the riKht to right to the greatest measure of general emancipatory conditions that a legal order can order can provide or promote equally for all. The associational order or set of social 8 practices social practices legislated by a political association has as its specific purpose securing this securing this universal human right for all individuals or citizens. Moreover, insofar as insofar as it succeeds in accomplishing this purpose, the norms of the associational order associational order that it legislates override direct applications of the comprehensive purposecomprehensive purpose. This means that they are to be observed, whatever the consequences.

In sum: our maximal common humanity prescribes a compound set of human of human rights: an inclusive substantive right to general emancipation; and the and the formative right of communicative respect, together with its private and public and public liberties, that this substantive right itself necessarily implies. 

If this view conspicuously fails to include a constitutional guarantee of any of any substantive rights, it in no way implies that individuals do not have such rights such rights or that democratic communities should not be engaged in securing themsecuring them. But even if individuals have such rights and democratic communities should communities should seek to secure them, whether any substantive rights should be stipulated be stipulated in a political constitution is another question. If democratic politics can politics can be constituted only as a full and free discourse, then the constitution as such as such should be explicitly neutral to all substantive principles and norms of human of human association, any claim for the validity of which may be contested and so and so need to be validated by means of the discourse.