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In one of his several different statements about metaphysics, Wittgenstein  Wittgenstein says: "Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The  The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between factual between factual and conceptual investigations" (Zettel: 458). 

I take it that one is justified in assuming that the colons in these two sentences two sentences in effect replace "are," in the first, or "is that," in the second. But if this if this yields a correct interpretation of his meaning, Wittgenstein's statement isstatement is, in reality, what Stephen Toulmin perceptively identifies as a "disguised comparisondisguised comparison"-in —in fact, two disguised comparisons (cf. An Examination of the Place the Place of Reason in Ethics: 190-193). 

"Philosophical investigations The same is true of his second sentence: "The essential thing about metaphysicsare conceptual investigations." That philosophical That philosophical investigations are, in an important respect, likeconceptual investigations conceptual investigations seems clear enough. For whether or not a philosophical statement philosophical statement is true is to be decided purely conceptually, by conceptual, or logical, analysis analysis. In this respect, philosophical statements are significantly like merely analytic merely analytic or tautological statements, whose truth is similarly not a factual, but a selfa self-answering, question. But are like merely analytic statements is one thing, simply simply are analytic statements, something else, so the comparison that Wittgensteinthat Wittgenstein's first sentence invites one to make is not open but disguised, and  and the statement it expresses, insofar apt to be misleading. 

The same is true of his second sentence: "The essential thing about metaphysics is that it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual and conceptual investigations." What is it, exactly, to "obliterate" a distinction? Considering  Considering the special force of "obliterate" in comparison with synonyms such synonyms such as "abolish," "exterminate," "extinguish," "eradicate," or "extirpate," one would one would presumably say that to obliterate is to destroy, or to do away with, so as to as to leave no trace of. But what does metaphysics actually do with "the distinction the distinction between factual and conceptual investigations"? Arguably, it does not does not destroy the distinction without a trace, but simply denies that it is exhaustiveis exhaustive. The distinction between "factual" and "conceptual" remains as intact as intact as it ever was because, although metaphysical statements are, in different in different respects, significantly like both of these other kinds of statements, they  they are, in reality, of neither kind but are sui generis. 

2Like factual statements, they are meaningful, if at all, only because they refer they refer to reality beyond themselves. But their referent is not "fact," in the literal the literal sense of something made or produced, and therefore merely contingentmerely contingent, but rather "factuality," in the sense of the utterly abstract structure belonging structure belonging to any even conceivable fact, and therefore something never made or made or produced but strictly necessary. And this, of course, is why metaphysical statements metaphysical statements are also significantly like conceptual statements that are merely analyticmerely analytic, and so true, not contingently, but necessarily. But, again, their likeness their likeness to conceptual statements in this respect in no way entails that they simply they simply are conceptual statements. For whereas merely analytic statements are properly are properly analyzed as hypothetical because necessarily true only conditionally, metaphysical  metaphysical statements are necessarily true unconditionally and so are not even not even meaningful unless they are categorical, their reference to reality being successfulbeing successful. 

One final point: although Wittgenstein's comparisons 20 February 2006 as disguised are only are only too apt to mislead, as comparisons-andcomparisons—and so a fortiori as open comparisons! -they —they can be importantly illumining. 

20 February 2006