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If "it is trifling with philosophical problems to accept as valid questions arid questions and answers that have no conceivable bearing on how we propose to live" (TOIO:373 f.), then  then how can any "speculative philosophy," or "categorial metaphysicscategorial metaphysics," escape the charge of "trifling" in this sense? 

So, too, if "the pragmatic principle [holds] that a metaphysics must be livable, must have a  reasonable relation to how one lives" (PCH: 687), how can how can any "categorial metaphysics" as  as such, i.e., as distinct from the transcendental the transcendental metaphysics it necessarily implies, possibly pass muster as a valid a valid metaphysics?

So, too, if "the pragmatic principle \[holds\] that a metaphysics must be livable, must have a reasonable relation to how one lives"

5 February 1998