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Wiki MarkupThe different things Bultmann says about "the need for acceptance \ [_das Geltungsbedürfnis_\]" are not as clear and consistent as they might be.unmigrated-wiki-markup

In some places -- notably in the essay, "_Christus des Gesetzes Ende_" (_GV_ 2: 32-58) -- he talks about it throughout as though it were a need only of "the natural man," i.e., one who, having always already refused to live solely by God's grace, is anxious lest her or his life slip away without meaning anything, and so undertakes to secure its meaning by her or his accomplishments. On this understanding, the need for acceptance would not be present and effective if one had trusted unreservedly in God, thereby accepting God's unconditional acceptance. Thus when Bultmann speaks elsewhere of "the need for acceptance of the natural man _\[_{_}das Geltungsbedürfnis_ _des nat{_}{_}ü{_}{_}rlichen Menschen_\]" (e.g., _GV_ 3: 192), it doesn't occur to anyone oriented to this understanding to suppose that this is other than a redundancy, since no one other than the natural man would have such a need.

Elsewhere, however, -- notably in the essay, "Gnade und Freiheit" (GV 2:149-161) – it becomes clear that this is not really what Bultmann means to say. Here "the need for acceptance" is treated -- in Heideggerian terms -- as an "existenzial," or "ontologisch," need, more or less like "Sorge," rather than as an "existenziell," or "ontisch," need peculiar to the natural man. Thus Bultmann says, "Das Geltungsbediirfnis Geltungsbedürfnis ist als solches nichts Perverses, sondern dem Menschen, der mit anderen und vor anderen leben mujJmuß, angemessen. Aber es ist ein GrundmijJvers tiindn isGrundmißverständnis, wenn er meint, seine Geltung erzwingen zu konnenkönnen, den Anspruch auf Geltung durch Leistung begriinden begründen zu konnenkönnen, -- durch sein Werk und durch sein Sein. 1m Im Grunde des Geltungsbediirfnisses Geltungsbedürfnisses liegt das Wissen um das Angewiesensein auf das Urteil anderer, und auf die Abhiingigkeit Abhängigkeit von ihnen; letzlich das Wisen Wissen um eine dem Urteil aller anderen Menschen iiberlegenen überlegenen Instanz, um Gott. Aber dieses Wissen wird pervertiert, wenn der Mensch die Geltung erzwingen will, wenn er einen durch eigene Leistung begriindeten begründeten Anspruch auf sie erhebt, wenn er nicht versteht, dajJ daß sie ihm nur geschenkt werden, dajJ daß er in Wahrheit nur aus Gnade leben kann" (152 f.). Clearly, on this understanding, Bultmann's talk of "the need for acceptance of the natural man" is not redundant, but a significant, carefully distinguishing formulation.
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As for the "knowledge" that he says lies at the bottom of the need for acceptance, isn't it just what he has in mind when he cites Augustine's "Tu nos fecisti ad te, et cor nostrum inquietum est, donee requieseat donec requiescat in te"?

1 December 2001