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Is there any place for a "fundamental ontology" in my understanding of metaphysics?

In my usual way of expounding what is meant by "metaphysics," I distinguish, with certain important provisions, between metaphysica generalis or ontology and metaphysica specialis, as comprising the three disciplines of psychology or, better, anthropology, cosmology, and theology. Underlying this distinction is my view that always already given – implicitly giveni—mplicitly or explicitly, authentically or inauthentically – in inauthentically—in any self-understanding and life-praxis is an understanding of self, world, and God (or, more generally, self, others, and the whole), and therewith an understanding of ultimate reality as such. Metaphysics in the broad sense, then, I take to be the attempt, at the secondary level of critical reflection and proper theory, to formulate this always already given understanding explicitly, in a clear and coherent conceptuality-terminology. 

In this attempt, the discipline of anthropology, or, as it might even better be called (considering how "anthropology" has now come to be used), existentialist analysis, plays a peculiar role. Unlike both the whole and others – not others—not any particular others, but some others, or others as such – the such—the self as such is not necessary but contingent. Insofar, then, as by "ultimate reality" is meant strictly ultimate reality, and thus what is necessary, as distinct from everything merely contingent, metaphysics in the strict sensesense—as critical reflection on and the proper theory of strictly ultimate reality – does reality—does not include, but rather excludes existentialist analysis. On the other hand, the self that as such is contingent is necessary to our understanding of ultimate reality – and reality—and that in two distinct but related senses of the words. It is thus necessary in one sense, because, unless we existed as selves, we could not understand anything, implicitly or explicitly, and so metaphysics, among other things, would be impossible. The self is thus necessary in a second sense, however, in that the self is the only sample of ultimate reality that we understand in the unique sense of also being it. Although we can never understand ourselves except by also understanding others and the whole, we are not others and the whole, and such understanding as we can have of either of them as they are in themselves must be derived somehow from our understanding of ourselves. 

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