By Schubert Ogden
On the Logic of the Relative
The relative, Hartshorne argues, is to be defined as "that which contains relations, not ... that which relations contain." "Insofar as a thing is absolute, it contains no relations; but relative things always contain relations to at least some other relative things, and to the absolute as well" ("Duality versus Dualism and Monism": 53 f.).
"\[T\]he universal rule for relative things is not interdependence but only dependence. Each depends upon some other things" (55).unmigrated-wiki-markup Wiki Markup
"Individuals who are contemporaries and near neighbors, or who endure long enough for influences to travel both ways, are indeed interdependent. . . . But though interdependence is the rule with neighbors or long-lasting individuals, independence is the rule with contemporary events or momentary states . . . , and these, and not individuals as enduring through change, are the most concrete entities. . . . \ [M\]omentary realities \ [are\] dependent upon previous realities and independent of later ones. . . . \ [I\]nclusion \ [or dependence\] runs backward, and noninclusion or independence\[,\] forward" (58).
10 March 1997