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Could the solution to my problem concerning "individualities" as yet a further type of ordinary, ontic abstracts-completing abstracts—completing the series beginning with "categories," and including "genera" and "species"-lie —lie in recognizing that the individual or individuating property of the universal individual, as distinct from any and all particular individuals, is itself transcendental, or a transcendental?

In other words, already included in the type of extraordinary, ontological abstracts is the individual or individuating property of the universal individuaL individual. So its unique individuality is already accounted for simply in mentioning the type "transcendentals."

Terminologically, I could use "essence," in the sense of "individual (or individuating) properties," as the

14 September 2005On the On the other hand, "individualities" as a distinct term ending the series "categories," "genera," "species," refers solely to the lowest kind of ordinary, ontic abstracts.

Terminologically, I could use "essence," in the sense of "individual (or individuating) properties," as the Oberbegriff, reserving "individuality" for the sole more specific purpose of designating this lowest kind of ordinary, ontic abtractsabstracts.

14 September 2005