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Niebuhr claims, perhaps correctly, that, in all early civilizations, "no one thought of the possibility of forming a community or even a government purely by an act of the will. The 'social contract' theory had not yet been conceived" (Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: 100). But this implied criticism of "the 'social contract' theory" presupposes that its intention is descriptive and historical rather than normative and systematic. By the same reasoning, one would quite miss the point that Niebuhr himself finds in the story and doctrine of original sin.

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Granted that modern thinkers may have undervalued the importance of so-called organic elements in the creation of community, their main concern was to hold out for the paramount importance of rational and artificial elements in the creation, maintenance, and transformation of government in accordance with the norms proper thereto. Thus it was no part of the social contract theory to deny or even to question that "the community is as primordial as the individual."

Wiki MarkupAs for Niebuhr's claim that, as a result of the "confident rationalism" and "excessive voluntarism" of proponents of the social contract theory, "\[b\]oth faith and tradition (for religion was obviously a support of tradition) were discredited" (104), it quite misses the real intention of at least some Enlightenment criticism. This intention becomes apparent, for example, in something like Madison's reflections in _Federalist_ 49 on the function of religion and the church in the total economy of human life as viewed from the standpoint of a sound philosophy---which is to sound philosophy—which is to say, a philosophy sufficiently impressed by the caution and timidity of "the reason of man when left alone" to realize that "the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side."

"In this connection, Niebuhr's interpretation of the phrase from the Constitution, "a more perfect union," also needs criticism. He's right, of course, that this phrase presupposes "a previous union." But, dearly, the union it presupposes is, in the first instance, the all too imperfect union of the Articles of Confederation. Moreover, the previous union that even that union, in turn, presupposes was not the union "established on the battlefield in a common struggle against a common foe," but rather the still earlier union of the whole American nation, which is to say, the people of all the American colonies bound together as, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, "one people."

29 March 2004unmigrated-wiki-markup

In the second paragraph above, I distinguish between two ways of interpreting the social contract theory by distinguishing between a descriptive theory about how _x_ _comes_ to be and a normative theory about how _x ought_ to be. I have since learned that the same point can be made by distinguishing between two ways of construing metaphorical terms like "convention" or "agreement," and, as I should think, "compact" as well. Thus, in explaining why value judgments assume "agreements" or "conventions/ ." Vincent Brümmer says, "The terrns terms 'agreement' and 'convention' must here be construed as functional and not as genetic metaphors: they clarify the way in which norms _function_ rather than their _origin_   . . . . \ [W\]e do not always make an agreement with our hearers about which norms to accept before we express a value judgement. Usually we simply _assume_ that our hearer accepts certain norms, whether or not these are agreed to in our society. This assumption underlies every value judgement" (_Theology and Philosophical Inquiry_: 114).

10 March 2007