Page History

...

In correcting some of my formulations  concerning the  unique 
authoritativeness of human reason over  all supposed  authorities"  (29  March 
1999), I speak of human reason as  "more exactly, the noetic,  as  distinct from 
the  ontic,  implicit  authorizing source." 
In correcting some of my formulations concerning the unique authoritativeness of human reason over all supposed authorities" (29  March 1999March 1999), I speak of human reason as   "more exactly, the noetic, as distinct from the ontic, implicit authorizing source." 

While this is correct enough as far as it goes, the qualification "human reasonhuman reason"  is is important. Why? Because, while human reason is certainly not the ontic, but only the noetic, implicit authorizing source, the tradition in which the meaning of "reason" has been discussed rightly allows  that that "reason" (logos, ratio, die Vernunft) has an ontic as well as a noetic reference, and even that it is possible and necessary to distinguish an eminent or divine reason (Logos,  RatioRatio). Therefore, while human reason is uniquely authoritative only as the noetic implicit source of authority, eminent or, symbolically speaking, divine  divine Reason is uniquely authoritative precisely as the antic ontic implicit source.

I should say that the ontic source of authority that, symbolically speaking, I may call "Reason" is to be spoken of literally, not simply as "reality," but as the "structure of reality," ontological as well as ontic, allowing that "reality" has and must have structure in itself as well as content, quality, or value in itself, in order also to have meaning for  usus. Thus its meaning for us is the meaning of its content in itself and its structure in itself for beings who live understandingly, or-to or—to say the same thing in different words-who words—who are endowed with human reason, or at any rate with reason in some form  appropriate appropriate to a noneminent or nondivine being. 

On some other occasion, I  need need to work out more fully the connections mentioned or suggested here among my several distinctions between "structure  and and content,"   "structure  and and meaning,"   "reason  and  experienceand experience," "intelligibility and mystery,"   "abstract and concrete,"  and and so on. 20 August 1999

20 August 1999