By Schubert Ogden
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To what extent can the difference between virtues in general and the "theological virtues" in particular be expressed by following the same line of thought I've followed in distinguishing original and actual sin, as well as original and actual righteousness?
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On my account, however, there is no way of being in the state or condition of original sin except by actually sinning, even as one cannot actually sin without thereby being in the state or condition of original sin. Correspondingly, one cannot exist in the state or condition of grace or faith, any more than in that of original rightousnessrighteousness, except by actually trusting and being loyal, even as one cannot trust and be loyal without thereby being in the state or condition of grace or faith, if not of original righteousness. Assuming, then, as I do, that the necessary conditions of faith also apply to hope and love, one could make parallel statements about each of them. Thus, in the case of all three of the "theological virtues," there is the same paradoxical relation of condition and act, indicative and imperative, that does not characterize virtues and the acts expressive of them generally.
This is tantamount to denying, presumably, that the "theological virtues" are really "virtues" at all -- at all—at least in the same univocal sense of the word.
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