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As is clear simply from the word, "ecclesia," Christians have from the very beginning understood themselves to be called, indeed, the called, the decisively called, just as they have understood Jesus Christ to be the one through whom God has decisively called them into the community of the decisively called, the "ecclesia,' " the church. But from a Christian standpoint, Christians as those whom God has decisively called are not alone in having been called by God. On the contrary, the decisively called understand themselves to belong to a much larger and more inclusive community of the called, comprising both the explicitly called and the implicitly called.

But wherein, exactly, does one's being a Christian, and so one of the decisively called, consist? It does not consist simply in one's being called to authentic existence in relation to the whole as well as oneself and all others, since both the implicitly called and the explicitly called are, in their different ways, also called to that. Being decisively called consists, rather, in one's being called to exist authentically in a very specific way, namely, both by the effective use and by the valid administration of the specifically Christian means of salvation. The means include not only the representative and so secondary means of word, sacraments, and special ministry, or even the constitutive and so primary means that is the visible church as such, but also, and above all, the primal means that is Jesus Christ himself. To be decisively called is to be called to exist authentically by effectively using Jesus Christ and the visible church as well as everything that in turn re-presents them in the way in which God intends that they all be used -- namely, by faith; and then, to join in the general ministry of validly administering these same means of salvation, so that others, too, may effectively use them -- and this by good works, by works of mercy as well as of piety, in John Wesley's terms, or, as may also be said, by witness, by implicit as well as explicit witness.

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9 July 1996; rev. 30 January 2002; 1 September 2006

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Wiki Markup"If "\[t\]o be a man ... is, as it were, to have an office," so that it makes sense to speak of a woman's or man's "office as a human being" (Adams), there is still the question of the sense it makes. The answer, arguably, is that the sense it makes is like the sense made in speaking about "the authority of reason or of facts" (De George). That is, it is an improper, non-literal, or, possibly, analogical or symbolic sense \ -\- in essentially the same way in which speaking of reality generally as a "society,' " or a "polis," or a "commonwealth" involves using such terms in improper, non-literal, extended senses. Thus, for example, God is not simply "_an_ authority," not even the highest or supreme authority, because God is also the _primal source_ of all authority. Likewise, my being a child of God and authorized by God to live as such is not properly or literally a matter of my being authorized to fill an "office." True as it is that no one can fill an office, properly so-called, without authorization, it is not true that any authorization must be an authorization to some office, again, in the proper sense. In other words, there is an exact parallel here with the statement that, although every authority, properly so-called, is as such also a source of authority, the converse is false: not every source of authority is _an_ authority in literally the same sense as any other.

8 September 1999; rev. 30 January 2002; 1 September 2006

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4. This suggests yet another direction in which "office" needs to be explored -- namely, in relation to christology, along the lines of Luther's claim that Jesus is called Christ, not because of his person, but because of his office (cf., e.g., WA, 16, : 217; 17, I,:255).

5. This, in turn, suggests that "office" also needs to be explored in relation to the distinction fundamental to christology between the empirical-historical Jesus and the existential-historical Jesus. (If, in general, an "office" exists in order to meet some human need, and anyone meeting this need can be said thereby to occupy or perform the corresponding office, then corresponding to the need to come to an explicit understanding of oneself that is true and authentic there exists the office of explicitly/decisively representing re-presenting such a self-understanding. What is properly meant by saying that Jesus is existentially significant, or that, as existentially significant, he is the existential-historical Jesus, is that he performs this office.)

6. "Office" may also need to be explored in relation to the traditional dogmas of the triune nature of God (one substance in three offices, or one office in three persons?) and of the divine-human person of Jesus Christ (one person in two offices, or one office in two natures?). Luther's description of creatures generally in respect of their several offices as larvæ Dei may also need to be kept in mind -- in connection, say, with the use of the term,
"persona."

29 September 1986; rev. 30 January 2002; 1 September 2006

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1. Just as religion, although one form of culture among others, is unique in being in its own way basic to all of the other cultural forms, so the office of being religious in some way or other, although one office among others, is unique in being in its own way basic to all the other offices. Although it is and rernains remains qua office distinct from the person performing it, it is related to the person, and the person to it, in a unique way, so that, like the person, it is in its own way basic to all of the other offices that a person may perform.

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3. Being ultimately rather than merely naturally religious in the sense of asking and answering one's own existential question in the terms of some ultimate religion as a "cultural system" is likewise a matter of perfonning performing one cultural role or office among others.

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