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Granted that there are differences between these two things, and that some of them may be significant, it still seems to me that this part ofHeideggerof Heidegger's early work may be said to belong to what Hartshorne speaks of as "logic in the broad sense" even as (again, in my words) "an ultimate or completely general theory of concrete entities as such" also belongs to it.

So I should say that, just as transcendental metaphysics in a broad sense includes something like Heidegger's existentialist analyisanalysis, so "logic in the broad sense" that includes transcendental metaphysics includes it as thus inclusive.

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Of course, the idea of God (just as any other utterly general, metaphysical idea) may be said to be "extralogical," in that it is beyond logic in the strict sense in which it is usually understood, as distinct from the broad sense just clarified. But this may in no way be taken to imply that the proposition, "God exists," is merely "empirical," in the usual sense of "conceivably falsifiable by experience"; for it isn't. In the broad sense of the term indicated above, it's "logical."

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Logicians will either have to be or become such in a broader sense than that in which "logic" is usually understood or else also have to be or become metaphysicians if they want to consider with care what is meant by such things as:
(1) the variables in quantification, or the variables for individuals;
(2) the lowest logical level, i.e., first-level entities = entities on the first logical level = values of the variables for individuals; or
(3) modalities in their extra-linguistic reference.

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