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Consider the following passages:

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"As a way of knowing, the acceptance of p on X's say-so is secondary. Legitimate epistemic authority is thus substitutional in nature. Its purpose is to substitute the knowledge of one person in a certain field for the lack of knowledge of another. It is in principle expendable and is open to challenge. X's knowledge of law or of medicine or of physics could, in principle, be acquired independently by Y, thus making the substitution unnecessary. Whenever one's belief is based on evidence that coerces belief or that constitutes it, then the belief is not based on authority" (The Nature and Limits of Authority: 36 f.).

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