By Schubert Ogden
Second Thoughts on The Point of Christology
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56 f. -- What does the analogy developed here establish if not that, for me, as for Schleiermacher (however inconsistently), Jesus "is known as the indispensable 'whence' of the common life of the Christian community" (Walter Lowe, on Schleiermacher's christology)? I, in fact, say as much later on when I say that "Jesus himself may and must be defined (in the only really significant meaning of 'Jesus' for Christian faith and witness) as the explicit primal source whence the original and originating witness of the apostles derives its primary authority" (103). The difficulty with Schleiermacher's christology is that he does not consistently proceed within the limits imposed by this as his starting point in developing what must be said about the person of Jesus -- just as, in his doctrine of God, he does not remain within the limits imposed by his starting point in the feeling of absolute dependence in developing all that must be said about the being of God (as Harvey long since demonstrated).unmigrated-wiki-markup
121 \ -\- In saying here that "what is meant by Jesus" in the earliest stratum of witness accessible to us \ -\- "and the _only_ thing that is meant by him \ -\- is the one who makes or at any rate implies such a claim \ [_sc_. as is explicated by the church's christological assertion\]," I naturally presupposed \ -\- unfortunately without doing so explicitly\! \ -\- the distinction made earlier between what the earliest witnesses "assert about Jesus in speaking of him as the subject of their christological formulations" and what they "assume about Jesus in so speaking of him" (59; d. 61 f.). The only thing that is meant by Jesus in asserting or implying what the christological assertion makes explicit is that "Jesus _means_ love, in the sense that through him the gift and demand of God's boundless love are made fully explicit as authorizing our own possibility of authentic faith and love" (122).
122 \ -\- The "existential-historical assertion" to which I refer here is not properly formulated as "Jesus means love," but rather in some such terms as, "The Jesus who means love is the explicit gift and demand of God," or "The Jesus who means love is the meaning of strictly ultimate reality for us made fully explicit." Accordingly, the last sentence in this paragraph should be rewritten as follows: "On the contrary, whatever the truth or falsity of any such empirical-historical assertions, to accept the claim represented in the apostolic witness as Jesus' claim is to accept a strictly existential-historical assertion \ -\- the assertion, namely, that the Jesus who means love is the explicit gift and demand of God and thus authorizes our own possibility of authentic faith and love." \ -\- Cf. my statement on 129 f. that "the assertion they \ [_sc_. christological formulations\] either make or imply is the existential-historical assertion that the understanding of existence explicitly authorized through him \ [_sc_. Jesus\] is one's authentic possibility of self-understanding in relation to ultimate reality." Wiki Markup
161-164 -- If there is anything in my writings that makes clear how very much I can benefit from Apel's and Habermas' efforts, it is the discussion here of the effects of historical consciousness. Viewed from the standpoint of their writings, I am in fact making a distinction here between the ideal community of communication, of active subjects, on the one hand, and the real society and culture, with its distinction between the few who are active subjects and the many who are passive objects, on the other. But how much more adequate my discussion would have been had I been able to make this distinction explicitly. Among other advantages, I could have expressly adverted to the role of psychoanalysis as well as critique of ideology as means whereby persons are enabled to become really the active subjects they always already are ideally. Yet another advantage is that I could have made clear the two principles of any viable emancipatory strategy: (1) survival; and (2) emancipation.
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2. Even so, it is not anything like the usual christology. Rather, as its title indicates, it asks about "the point of christology," on the assumption that either the meaning or the truth of christology, or both, are problematic, and that doubly – -- because of the usual revisionary christology no less than because of traditional, "orthodox" christology.
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xi -- "... a critical inquiry into the point of all such doctrinal formulations"
1 f. \ -\- "\[T\]he witness to Jesus as the Christ" is "christology in the primary sense of the word," while "either the process or the product of critically reflecting on \ [this\] witness" is "christology in another, secondary sense."unmigrated-wiki-markup Wiki Markup
4 \ -\- "\[T\]he principal task to which this book is offered as a contribution" is "to further the effort in our situation today toward a christology of reflection that will be fully critical. . . ." Alternatively, is it is "to help develop a christology of reflection that, again in our situation, will be credible as well as appropriate . . . ." More simply still, it is "to make the point of the christology of witness as theology today is given and called to make this point."
5 -- But "one can make the point of christology today only by also talking about it."unmigrated-wiki-markup
14 \ -\- "The specific problem this book is an attempt to solve . . . is whether there can be such a thing as a revisionary christology that is not problematic in this same way \ [_sc_. as all or most other revisionary christologies, past and present\]."
What do I seek to do in The Point of Christology?
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