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It seems inadequate to me because, on what I should accept as an adequate epistemology or cognitional theory, "feeling" is so far from being a "third" alongside thinking and acting as to be the original, primal moment in both, and thus in science and and morality as well as in metaphysics and religion. Feeling is to be understood, following Whitehead, as simply the experience in the pure mode of causal efficacy lying at the base of all our experience and cognition as such. In less technical terms, feeling is our primal sense of worth -- of existence and value -- differentiating itself, as Whitehead says, into the threefold sense of ourselves, others, and the whole. Furthermore, if Hegel's quip that, on Schleiermacher's understanding, a dog must be the best Christian really is beside the point, this can only be because religion, properly so-called, is, in its own way, or at its own level, a matter of understanding, and not simply of feeling -- again, properly so-called. Of course, "feeling" can be used broadly enough to include understanding. But, then, the question becomes, What distinguishes the understanding included in piety or religious feeling from the understanding(s) included in the presumably different modes of feeling underlying thinking and acting, science and morality, and so on?

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