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From my standpoint, the position Bultmann thus argues for is confused. I would insist, on the contrary, that interpretation needs to be guided by the truth question only in the sense that, insofar as the interpretans consists in cognitively meaningful utterances, or assertions that claim to be true (or false), it needs and deserves to be interpreted accordingly, by the interpreter's taking its utterances to make or imply claims that need and deserve to be validated critically validated insofar as they become sufficiently problematic to require critical validation. But so understanding the interpretans in no way requires believing its utterances (or, for that matter, either believing or disbelieving them!). It requires only that one understand them as making a claim to truth, and thus to be believed. So, too, I maintain that neither exegesis nor theology generally presupposes faith -- as distinct from presupposing the question of faith.

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