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But I never experience my own experiences except in a context in which I experience other things, somehow distinct from my experiences. Every experience has both an aspect of perception in the sense of impersonal memory and an aspect of memory in the sense of personal (or self-) perception, sense perception being distinct from both. Evidently, the objects most immediately remembered impersonally, however dimly and inadequately, are the objects comprising my own nervous system; for perception in the sense of impersonal memory is a direct intuition of some part of the neural process in my own body. The objects thus remembered as then given in my sense perception of them are qualitatively determined, in that to perceive the objects and to have a certain kind of qualitative experience are one and the same thing. Thus insofar as science for its purposes abstracts from the qualitative in experience, or treats it simply as a pointer or index to observable behavior, and hence mathematically formulable structures of relations and of relations of relations, there is more to our experience and to the objects our experience perceives than science takes into account.

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