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Hartshorne argues that psychicalism cannot be falsified because nothing positive can conflict with the presence of mind in some form. But why is it that there can be no such conflict? Is it because "mind in some form," although a term expressing a clear as well as a coherent concept, in no way conflicts with any term expressive of the concept of something positive? Or is it simply because "mind in some form" is a phrase that is either clear but not coherent or else coherent but not clear -- and clear—and so, being merely verbal and not a meaningful term at all, really says nothing and therefore nothing with which anything positive can conflict?

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My strong suspicion, now as before, is that no such reason can be given. In any case, for all that Hartshorne ever shows to the contrary, it is impossible to distinguish other than verbally between a supposedly analogical use of "experience" and other psychical terms, on the one hand, and their use merely as images, symbols, or metaphors, on the other. Moreover, the meaning of these terms when they are used metaphysically, as supposed "analogies," cannot really be distinguished from the meaning of the other literal terms whose unrestricted application they necessarily presuppose, except by openly or tacitly committing the pathetic fallacy of treating a merely particular variable as universal. This is why, then, I continue to think that any supposedly "analogical" use of psychical terms in Hartshorne's distinctive sense of the word is either empty, adding nothing to what can be said literally, in purely formal, transcendental terms, or else fallacious -- andfallacious—and, if fallacious, implicitly self-contradictory into the bargain.

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