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Of course, this is only what one would expect Hartshorne to say, holding, as he does, that God must be conceived as in every way unsurpassable by others, and in that sense perfect -- absolutely —absolutely perfect in every respect in which anything logically could be so, and relatively perfect in every other respect. Accordingly, God's power over others, no less than God's goodness toward and knowledge of them, is absolutely perfect, such that none greater can be conceived. It is as great as any power over others could conceivably be and, therefore, can only be conceived as maximal and without limits (cf. DR: 138).

There is nothing surprising or inconsistent, then, in Hartshorne's saying the kinds of things he does about God's action -- such action—such as, for example, that God "sets" the rules by which the creatures must play the game of life, and even that God "enforces" these rules ("Process Philosophy as a Resource for Christian Thought"; 55); that God "issues directives" or gives "stage directions" to the creatures, "decides," or "decides upon," the general outlines of the world plan, or provides "the necessary limits to disorder among the always partly self-made creatures" (PCH: 597); and that God "institutes," "imposes," or "decrees," natural laws, thereby "guaranteeing" certain limits to creaturely freedom (" A New Look at the Problem of Evil": 206; "Our Knowledge of God": 61).

But if Hartshorne's talk about God's persuading creatures is in no way intended to suggest that God's influence on them is anything less than the greatest that can be conceived, what's its point? What is the alternative to persuasion that stressing it is intended to exclude? One can answer, of course, "coercion." But if this answer is taken to imply that God's influence on, or power over, the creatures is anything less than the maximally conceivable, Hartshorne's point in constrasting contrasting "persuasion" with "coercion" is clearly misunderstood. What he has in mind in drawing this contrast is well indicated by the following passage, in which he contrasts the laws of nature that are "true 'acts of God'" with human laws. "Unlike human laws," he says, "the cosmic or divine laws or regularities are not maintained by sanctions, threatened punishments for deviations. Punishments are our poor human substitutes for the ideal means of making laws effective. God persuades the creatures to accept the laws as patterns for their behaviour. He makes certain patterns attractive to them.... God charms the creatures. If you like, this is irresistible grace" ("God and Nature": 58).

To take what Hartshorne says here seriously is to realize that, as he uses it, "coercion" stands, not for a greater power over others than "persuasion," but for a lesser -- a lesser—a "poor substitute" for the ideal way of moving others by moving oneself, by so responding to their actions that, up to a certain point, at least, they cannot fail to respond in return (cf. DR: 141 f.;
127).

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