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\[t\]he eighteenth century did not invent the contrast between natural and revealed theology, but in the course of the Deist Controversy the inherited priority was reversed. The insufficiency of the light of nature had formerly been the basis of the Protestant appeal to Scripture: reason was unambiguously subordinated to revelation, and the mainline theologians did not expect to discover beyond Christianity anything but superstition and idolatry. Indeed, that is what the Puritans found in Roman Catholicism and even, in smaller measure, in Anglicanism. They agreed with Calvin's verdict that human nature is a 'perpetual factory of idols,' and that only Scripture can clarify 'the otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds. . . .

The Deist Controversy in England led to a reversal of the old belief that the weakness or perversity of human reason required revelation to supplement and correct it: the Deists countered that every human claim to possess a revelation is subject to rational scrutiny. Fundamental to their approach was the view that naive naïve privileging of Christian discourse, resting as it did on the assumed possession of an unparalleled revelation, had to yield to a pluralist interpretation of Christianity as one religion among others.

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Wiki Markup

Elsewhere he develops the same argument as follows:

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Luther argues, first of all, that even the heathen would have been saved if only they had simply gone with the knowledge of God and of God's will that God had naturally manifested to them, instead of proceeding to develop it under the guidance of a sinful, self-serving reason, which supplied the minor premise to the "practical syllogism," the major premise for which God had provided by God's original self-manifestation (LW, 25: Lectures on Romans: 157 ifff.),.

But Luther also argues, secondly – as secondly—as P.S. Watson points out in interpreting his doctrine of vocation – that vocation—that it is impossible to attend rightly to our vocation by setting up a fixed rule of behaviour, an unvarying code of conduct. Every new situation that arises for us demands fresh treatment, new decisions, and the adjustment of our actions to its needs.

Wiki MarkupIf we ask Luther \ [Watson adds\] on what principles we are to base our decisions, how we are to know the right thing to do, he wil1 will reply: You must ask what love requires, or what reason dictates. By that he means that we must consider the situation, not in the light of our own wishes and desires and preconceived ideas, but 'objectively,' as we should say, to see what really needs to be done and what can be done for the best. It is interesting to observe how he sets 'reason' and 'love' side by side, quite sure that the reasonable thing to do is just what love would want done ("Luther's Doctrine of Vocation": 371 f.).

Luther also argues, thirdly, in ways such as the following:

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